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ARTICLE
The Chinese Legal Tradition as a Cultural
Constraint on the Westernization of Chinese
Environmental Law and Policy:
Toward a Chinese Environmental Law and
Policy Regime with More Chinese
Characteristics
PAUL A. BARRESI
More than half a century of rapid industrialization has left
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reeling from a precipitous
decline in environmental quality.1 According to the World Bank,
environmental pollution causes about 750,000 premature deaths
in the PRC every year.2 About half of them are due to outdoor
urban air pollution, with indoor air pollution causing most of the
rest.3 Water pollution causes about 60,000 premature deaths
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1. See generally ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S FUTURE 50-53, 59-94 (2d ed. 2010);
JUDITH SHAPIRO, MAO'S WAR AGAINST NATURE 195 (2001).
2. Richard McGregor, 750,000 a Year Killed by Chinese Pollution, FIN.
TIMES, July 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f40e248-28c7-11dc-af78000b5df10621.html#axzz1inmnqOP4.
3. See id. The PRC's air pollution woes appeared to reach a new high in
January 2013 when air quality monitoring equipment on the roof of the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing recorded an air quality index of 755 on a U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) scale of 0 (for the best air quality) to
500 (for the worst air quality), with any level above 100 meaning that the air is
"unhealthy" and any level above 300 meaning that the air is "hazardous."
Edward Wong, On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing's Air Quality Tops 'Crazy Bad' at
755, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/science/
earth/beijing-air-pollution-off-the-charts.html. Cf. AIRNOW, Air Quality Index
(AQI) – A Guide to Air Quality and Your Health, http://airnow.gov/index.cfm?
action=aqibasics.aqi (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (explaining USEPA's air quality
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annually, mostly in the countryside.4 According to the PRC’s
State Council, which under the PRC’s Constitution5 functions as
both the executive body of the national legislature–the National
People’s Congress (NPC)–and the highest organ of state
administration,6 environmental degradation from pollution and
other sources costs the PRC more than $200 billion annually,
which is ten percent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP),7
and roughly the same as its GDP growth rate in recent years.8
The social costs of the PRC’s environmental crisis have been just
as dramatic.9 Grass roots environmental protests–many of them
violent–have become increasingly common, sometimes averaging
as much as one every other day.10 In perhaps the biggest and

index). Within two days, the municipal government had enacted a week-long
emergency response plan that ordered nearly 100 major businesses to rein in
their emissions by stopping or reducing production and removed nearly a third
of government vehicles from the roads, and within a week had released a
proposal to strengthen its air pollution regulations. Air Pollution: Beijing
Proposes New Regulations, Penalties to Deal with Record Levels of Air Pollution,
36 INT'L ENV'T REP. 144 (2013).
4. See McGregor, supra note 2.
5. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1982, as amended
1988, 1993, 1999 & 2004), translated at http://english.people.com.cn/
constitution/constitution.html [hereinafter PRC CONST., with the date of
enactment of provisions currently in force noted parenthetically].
6. Id. art. 85 (1982).
7. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, General Policy: China Environmental
Assessment Estimates $200 Billion Annual Damage from Pollution, 29 INT'L
ENV'T REP. 438 (2006).
8. See THE WORLD BANK, GDP Growth (annual %), http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
9. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Anger in China Rises Over Threat to
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/
19/international/asia/19china.html; Andrew Jacobs, In China, Pollution Worsens
Despite New Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
07/29/world/asia/29china.html; Ian Johnson, China Faces 'Very Grave'
Environmental Situation, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/06/04/world/asia/04china.html?ref=world; Joseph Kahn & Jim
Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html; Michael
Standaert, Toxic Substances: China to Launch Checks on Chemical Plants,
Restrict New Companies to Industrial Parks, 34 INT'L ENV'T REP. 917 (2011);
Qian Yanfeng, Protests Help Clear the Air, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 4, 2009, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-08/04/content_8514306.htm.
10. See ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 4, 89-91; Reuters, Pollution Fuels Protests
and Riots, Says Environmental Boss, STANDARD, Apr. 21, 2006, http://www.
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most violent such protest to date, 30,000 to 40,000 villagers
attacked thirteen chemical plants in Zhejiang (Che-chiang)
Province that they blamed for a rash of crop failures, air
pollution, and spontaneous miscarriages in the region, breaking
windows, assaulting government officials, overturning buses, and
setting police cars on fire.11
This environmental crisis is similar in kind to–if not greater
in scale than–the creeping barrage of environmental horrors that
by the late 1960s had pummeled the West into realizing that
something had to be done to stop and, if possible, to reverse the
negative environmental impacts of industrialization.12 From
killer smog events to urban rivers so burdened with industrial
pollution that stray sparks were enough to cause them to burst
into flame,13 this firestorm of environmental degradation finally
galvanized Western countries into action.14 They responded with
a flood of environmental statutes and regulations.15 Although
new environmental challenges have emerged since most of this
enacted law debuted in the West, especially at the global level,16

thestandard.com.hk/news_print.asp?art_id=17058&sid=7588930. According to
one official estimate, the number of pollution "disputes" in the PRC–in whatever
form–exceeded 50,000 in 2005 alone. Id.
11. See ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 90.
12. See id. at 28 ("[W]hat sets China today apart from the United States of a
century ago . . . is the scale of the environmental degradation it confronts . . . .").
13. See generally DEVRA LEE DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER 28-29
(2002); WILLIAM WISE, KILLER SMOG: THE WORLD'S WORST AIR POLLUTION
DISASTER 60 (1968); Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing
a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002).
14. Cf., e.g., Edmund S. Muskie, A Whole Society, Address at Harvard
University and the University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 21-22, 1970), in EARTH DAY
– THE BEGINNING 90, 91-92 (Nat’l Staff of Envtl. Action eds., 1970) (decrying
certain negative environmental impacts of economic growth and prosperity, and
urging listeners to vote with an "environmental conscience").
15. See, e.g., Michael E. Kraft, U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From
the 1960s to the 1990s, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, 1960S-1990S 17,
22-25, 30 (Otis L. Graham ed., 2000). Cf. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON,
MANUAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW vii-xiv (2d ed. 1997) (observing that
a few, mostly industrialized states adopted national environmental legislation in
the 1960s, but that almost all states had adopted environmental legislation by
the 1990s, mostly based on European or American models).
16. Cf., e.g., SPENCER R. WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 150-53
(rev. ed. 2008).
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it has been remarkably successful in mitigating the relatively
localized problems that most of it was intended to address.17
Since 1979, the PRC has sought to emulate the West in that
regard.18 The Standing Committee of the NPC19 adopted in trial
form the PRC’s first environmental statute20–the Environmental
Protection Law21–in 1979, then revised it substantially and
adopted it in permanent form in 1989.22 This statute, which
established the framework for the elaboration of the PRC’s
17. See generally Jesse H. Ausubel, David G. Victor & Iddo K. Wernik, The
Environment Since 1970, 1 CONSEQUENCES NO. 3 (Autumn 1995) available at
http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/fall95/envir.html
(assessing
environmental change worldwide since 1970).
18. Cf., e.g., A COURSE IN CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW 6-8
(Zhang Kunmin & Jin Ruilin eds., 1992) [hereinafter ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN
RUILIN] (arguing that the progress of environmental protection in China
depends on environmental protection laws, and summarizing the development of
those laws from 1979 through the early 1990s).
19. The NPC shares the State's legislative power with its own Standing
Committee. E.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 58 (1982). For the complex
relationship between the two, see id. art. 67, §§ 1-2, 4, 6-7, 8, 11-17; id. amend.
IV, § 10 (2004) (revising subparagraph [section] 20 of article 67), and compare
id. art. 62, §§ 3, 5-6, 9-10, 11, 14, art. 63, §§ 2-3 (1982) (enumerating the
functions and powers of the NPC), with id. art. 67, §§ 3, 5, 9-10, 18-19
(enumerating the functions and powers of the NPC's Standing Committee).
20. By "statute," I mean legislation adopted by the National People's
Congress or its Standing Committee and promulgated by the President. Cf.
Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 726-27
(1994), reprinted in CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 239 (Perry Keller ed., 2001)
(explaining the challenge of translating the Chinese terms for various categories
of legislation into English).
21. Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, promulgated by
Order No. 22 of the President P.R.C., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989),
translated in ECOLEX, http://www.ecolex.org (Legislation ID number: LEXFAOC003551) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Envtl. Prot. Law].
22. Compare id., with Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic
of China (for Trial Implementation) (adopted in principle by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 13, 1979, effective Sept. 13, 1979), translated
in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available
at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/eplotproc564/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
PRC Envtl. Prot. Law Trial Version]; see also PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note
21, art. 47 (abrogating the trial statute). The PRC expects to update its
Environmental Protection Law again by 2015, partly on the basis of a pilot
reform project slated to be undertaken in one province in central China in the
interim. See Michael Standaert, China: Country to Try Out Updated Version of
Environmental Law in Shanxi Province, 34 INT'L ENV'T REP. 708 (2011)
[hereinafter Standaert 07/20/11].
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environmental law regime,23 marked the leading edge of a deluge
of other environmental statutes, regulations, decisions, circulars,
and other legally normative measures that resemble their
Western counterparts in many ways.24 Like its Western analog,
environmental law in the PRC is highly technical and scientific,25
and almost labyrinthine in its complexity.26 The statutes at their
core generally conform to the substantive legal taxonomy
established in the West. In accordance with this taxonomy, the
PRC has enacted an environmental impact assessment statute,27
an air pollution control statute,28 a water pollution control
statute,29 a solid waste management statute,30 a noise pollution
23. Cf. ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 13 (describing the
statute as providing the basis for "drafting specialized environmental protection
regulations and rules").
24. See, e.g., Li Kuntao & Li Wenzeng, Introduction to China's
Environmental Protection Laws, CHINESE EDUC. & SOC'Y, May/June 2004, at 21,
22; Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies
and Suggested Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 159, 161, 184-87, 190-93 (2007). Cf.
ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 7-8 (describing enacted
environmental law in the PRC as "an environmental statute system
characterized with Chinese features").
25. See ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 8-9.
26. See id. at 9. Environmental law is hardly unique in this respect in the
PRC. Cf. Keller, supra note 20, at 711 ("The disparate mass of laws and
regulations which makes up the formal written sources of Chinese law does not
possess sufficient unity to be regarded as a coherent body of law.").
27. Law of the People's Republic of China on Evaluation of Environmental
Effects (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2002,
effective Sept. 1, 2003), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/
cen/laws/eoeel368/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Envtl. Effects Evaluation Law].
28. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of
Atmospheric Pollution (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
April 29, 2000, promulgated by the President P.R.C., April 29, 2000, effective
Sept. 1, 2000), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
lotprocotpacoap841/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law].
29. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of
Water Pollution (adopted as revised by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Feb. 28, 2000, promulgated by Order No. 87 of the President P.R.C., Feb.
28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), translated in ECOLEX, http://www.ecolex.org
(Legislation ID number: LEX-FAOC003551) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Water
Pollution Law].
30. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes (adopted as amended by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, promulgated by Order No. 77 of the
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control statute,31 and a marine environmental protection
statute,32 as well as an array of forestry, fisheries, wildlife, and
other
natural
resource
statutes
with
environmental
implications.33
Many of the policy design principles and implementation
strategies around which these statutes revolve are Western in
origin. For example, some PRC environmental statutes have
embraced versions of the polluter pays or pollution prevention
principles, which since emerging in the West in the 1970s have
become prominent if not necessarily pervasive features of
The polluter pays principle
Western environmental law.34
President P.R.C., Oct. 29, 1996, effective April 1, 2005), translated in ASIAN
LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://
www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocotpacoepbsw1034/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
PRC Solid Waste Law].
31. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of
Environmental Noise Pollution (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Oct. 29, 1996, promulgated by Order No. 77 of the President P.R.C., Oct.
29, 1996, effective March 1, 1997), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/
legis/cen/laws/lotprocotpacoenp931/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Noise Pollution
Law].
32. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China
(adopted as revised by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 25, 1999,
promulgated by Order No. 26 of the President P.R.C., Dec. 25, 1999, effective
April 1, 2000), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
meplotproc607/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. Law].
33. See Canfa, supra note 24, at 187-90.
34. Compare, e.g., PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 3, and PRC
Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 3, para. 1, art. 5, and PRC Envtl. Prot.
Law, supra note 21, art. 24, art. 28, para. 1, with, e.g., Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 191, § 2, 2010 O.J. (C
83) 47, 132, and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §
108(k), 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), (b)(4), (c)), and
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. VI, subtit. F, 104 Stat.
1388-321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109), and Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 224(a)(2), 98 Stat. 3221, 3253
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b)(1)), and Council Directive 2008/1, Integrated
Pollution Prevention and Control (Codified Version), pmbl. ¶ 2, art. 1, art. 2(12),
art. 3(1)(a)-(d), art. 6(1)(f)-(g), art. 9(3)-(4), art. 11, art. 13(1), (2)(b), art. 17(2),
annex IV, 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8, 8, 10, 11-12, 13-14, 15, 16, 25 (EC), and Org. Econ.
Co-operation & Dev. [OECD] Council, Recommendation of the Council on
Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of
Environmental Policies, at ¶ I, annex ¶ a(4), OECD Doc. C(72) 128 (May 26,
1972), available at http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?
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imposes the costs of pollution prevention and control on the
polluters themselves.35 The pollution prevention principle–also
known as “P2,” “source reduction,” or “cleaner production”–gives
priority to reducing or to eliminating pollution at its source, with
end-of-pipe pollution control measures serving merely as a
fallback strategy.36 Indeed, the PRC has adopted a stand-alone
statute to promote pollution prevention.37
The PRC’s environmental laws also seek to implement these
and other policy design principles by means of a host of Western
implementation strategies. For example, the PRC’s air and water
pollution control statutes revolve around both ambient
environmental quality standards and performance standards,
which have been hallmarks of Western air and water pollution
control laws since the 1970s.38 In general, the ambient air and
InstrumentID=4&Lang=en&Book=False [hereinafter OECD Environmental
Recommendation], and National Pollution Prevention Roundtable, Blueprint for
Pollution Prevention & Sustainable Development: A Work in Progress, at apps.
A-B (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.
edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprnts.blueprint.htm (summarizing the history of the
pollution prevention principle as both a private sector cost control strategy and
a public policy design principle in the United States and around the world)
[hereinafter National P2 Roundtable Blueprint], and Nicolas de Sadeleer, The
Polluter-Pays Principle in EU Law – Bold Case Law and Poor Harmonisation, in
PRO NATURA. FESTSKRIFT TIL H.C. BUGGE 405, 406-08 (2012), available at http://
www.desadeleer.eu/uploads/papers/de%20Sadeleer.pdf
(summarizing
the
recognition of the polluter pays principle in European Union law since the
1970s).
35. See, e.g., OECD Environmental Recommendation, supra note 34, at annex
¶ a(4). Cf. ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 80-84 (defining and
explaining the derivation and significance of the "principle of 'who pollutes, who
treats'" in the context of the PRC's Environmental Protection Law).
36. See National P2 Roundtable Blueprint, supra note 34, at 6, apps. A-B. Cf.
ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 51-55 (defining and explaining
the rationale for the "principle of laying stress on prevention" in the context of
the PRC's Environmental Protection Law).
37. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Promotion of Cleaner
Production (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2002,
promulgated by Order No. 72 of the President P.R.C., June 29, 2002, effective
Jan. 1, 2003), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
pocpl354/ (P.R.C.).
38. Compare PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, arts. 11-12, art. 13,
paras. 1-2, and PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 28, art. 6, art. 7,
paras. 1-2, and PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 9, paras. 1-2,
art. 10, with, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§
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water quality standards are limits on specific pollutants–usually
applied as numerical concentrations averaged over a given period
of time–that apply to the ambient outdoor air or to the water
circulating in lakes, rivers, and other water bodies.39 The
corresponding performance standards are generally limits on the
same pollutants–usually applied numerically, but not necessarily
as concentrations–that apply to airstreams emitted into the
ambient air or to effluents discharged into the ambient water.40
301(a), (b)(2)(A)(i), 303(a)-(c), (g)-(h), 86 Stat. 816, 844-45, 846-48, 850 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (b)(2)(A)(i), 1313 (a)-(c), (g)-(h)),
and Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 109, 111, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80, 168384 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7411), and Council
Directive 2008/50, Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe, annexes
VII, XI, XIV, 2008 O.J. (L 152) 1, 24-25, 30-31, 34-35 (EC), and Council Directive
2001/80, Limitation of Emissions of Certain Pollutants into the Air from Large
Combustion Plants, annexes III-VII, 2001 O.J. (L 309) 1, 12-17 (EC), and
Council Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action in the Field of
Water Policy, arts. 10(2)(b), 16(1), (7)-(8), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 18, 25 (EC) (as
amended); see generally ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 14
(listing the different types of "environmental protection standards" in the PRC).
The PRC's Environmental Protection Law established the legal framework for
the promulgation of both ambient environmental quality and performance
standards. See PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 21, art. 9-10.
39. See, e.g., Council Directive 2008/50, Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air
for Europe, art. 2(1)-(3), (5), (9), (14), (21), 2008 O.J. (L 152) 1, 4-5 (EC); Council
Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water
Policy, art. 2(31), (35), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 10-11 (EC) (as amended). For
example, pursuant to the administrative rule-making authority granted to it by
the U.S. Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has
set the "national primary 1-hour annual ambient air quality standard" for
oxides of sulfur, measured in the ambient air as sulfur dioxide, at 75 parts per
billion. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.17(a) (2012). Similarly, pursuant to the authority
granted to it by the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, USEPA has set
the "ambient water quality criteria" for bacteria in coastal recreation waters in
certain States at levels expressed as numbers of visible bacteria per 100
milliliters of water. See id. §§ 131.41(a), (c)-(e). Ambient air and water quality
standards in the PRC follow the same general pattern. See, e.g., Environmental
Quality Standard for Surface Water (approved by the State Envtl. Prot. Admin.,
Apr. 26, 2002, effective June 1, 2002), tbls./lists 1-3, translated at JIANGSU
TIANYI SCI. & TECH. DEV. CO., JIANGSU WATER TREATMENT NET, available at
http://www.jstykj.com/en/release/review.asp?id=66
(P.R.C.);
CLEAN
AIR
INITIATIVE FOR ASIAN CITIES, China Releases New Ambient Air Quality
Standards: PM2.5 Standards Set, http://cleanairinitiative.org/ portal/node/8163
(last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
40. See, e.g., Council Directive 2001/80, Limitation of Emissions of Certain
Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants, art. 2(1)-(3), 2001 O.J. (L
309) 1, 2-3 (EC); Council Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action
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The law generally requires these performance standards to be set
at levels sufficient to achieve the ambient standards within the
constraints imposed by available or affordable pollution control
technologies.41 In the water pollution realm, caps on the total
loads of pollutants discharged into receiving waters, which are
disaggregated and parceled out among the sources of those
pollutants, can help to achieve ambient water quality standards
when technology-based performance standards are a limiting
in the Field of Water Policy, art. 2(40), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 11 (EC) (as
amended). For example, pursuant to the administrative rule-making authority
granted to it by the U.S. Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) has prohibited the emission into the atmosphere from certain
fossil-fuel-fired steam generators of any gases containing sulfur dioxide in
excess of certain amounts measured in nanograms per Joule or pounds per
million British thermal units of heat input as a "standard of performance." 40
C.F.R. § 60.43 (2011). Similarly, pursuant to the administrative rule-making
authority granted to it by the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, USEPA
has set "effluent limitations representing the degree of effluent reduction
attainable by the application of the best available technology economically
achievable" for certain pollutants discharged from certain steam electric power
generating point sources at levels expressed as concentrations measured in
micrograms per liter, as amounts equal to the flows of the discharges multiplied
by those concentrations, or as a prohibition on any discharge or detectable
amount, depending on the pollutant and the discretion of the permitting
authority. 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.13(a)-(b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e), (g) (2012). Performance
standards for sources of air and water pollution in the PRC follow the same
general pattern. See, e.g., Air Pollution: New Limits on Steel Industry Pollution
Set in China, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. 869 (2012); Michael Standaert, Mining: China
Prepares to Issue New Standards to Clean Up Rare Earths Mining Sector, 34
INT'L ENV'T REP. 94 (2011).
41. Compare PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 13, paras. 1-2,
and PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 28, art. 7, paras. 1-2, and PRC
Marine Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 9, para. 1, art. 10, with, e.g.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 302(a), 304(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(a),
1314(b) (2006), and Clean Air Act §§ 107(a), 110(a)(1)-(2)(A), 172(b)-(c)(1), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1)-(2)(A), 7502(b)-(c)(1) (2006). See generally Council
Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water
Policy, art. 16(8), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 25 (EC) (as amended) (requiring to
establish "environmental quality standards" for and "controls" on the principal
sources of discharges of priority water pollutants to surface waters in certain
circumstances based on "consideration of all technical reduction options," among
other things); PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 21, art. 10, paras. 1-2 (requiring
"national standards for the discharge of pollutants" to be established "in
accordance with the national standards for environmental quality and the
country's economic and technological conditions," and permitting certain local
governments to establish supplementary or stricter local standards in certain
circumstances).
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factor, although the law makes the instrumental value of these
caps more explicit in the West than in the PRC.42
The list of Western-style features of the PRC’s environmental
laws hardly ends there. A few more examples should be sufficient
to illustrate the point. The PRC’s noise pollution control statute,
for example, revolves around analogs of the ambient
environmental quality and performance standards embedded in
its air and water pollution control statutes, thus following the
lead established by Western noise pollution control laws decades
ago.43 Similarly, the PRC’s solid waste management statute
adopts an essentially Western conception of solid waste, which is
expansive enough to encompass solid, semi-solid, and
containerized gaseous wastes, and which dates from the 1970s.44
The same statute also uses an almost equally long-standing
Western approach to identify certain solid wastes as hazardous
wastes. In accordance with this approach, some hazardous
wastes qualify as such because they exhibit certain physical
characteristics when subjected to certain scientific testing
protocols, whereas others qualify because they appear on a list of
solid wastes deemed to be hazardous by administrative
authorities.45 The same statute’s complex definition of waste
42. Compare PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 18, paras. 1-3,
with Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(d)(1)-(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(2) (2006). See generally Council Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community
Action in the Field of Water Policy, art. 10(3), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 19 (EC) (as
amended) (requiring "more stringent emission controls" to be imposed when
"emission limit values," among other pollution control measures, would be
insufficient to achieve a given "quality standard"). Cf. PRC Marine Envtl. Prot.
Law, supra note 32, art. 10 (requiring "the determination of water pollutant
discharge standards . . . [to] take the control standards of the standards to
control [sic] the total load of key pollutants for sea disposal as an important
basis" in marine areas where total pollutant loads are being controlled).
43. Compare PRC Noise Pollution Law, supra note 31, art. 10, para. 1, art.
11, with, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1972, §§ 5(a)(2), 6(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. §§
4904(a)(2), 4905(a)-(c) (2006), and Council Directive 2002/49, Assessment and
Management of Environmental Noise, art. 5(4), art. 8, annex V, § 1, 2002 O.J. (L
189) 12, 15-16, 23 (EC), and Council Directive 83/206, Limitation of Noise
Emissions from Subsonic Aircraft, art. I(1), (3), (5), (7), 83 O.J. (L 117) 15, 15-16
(EEC).
44. Compare PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 88, § 1, with Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2006).
45. Compare PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 88, § 4, with 40 C.F.R.
§§ 261.3(a)(2)(i)-(ii), 261.20(a), 261.21-.24, 261.31-.33 (2012), and Council
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“treatment” also shows clear signs of having been influenced by
Western law.46 Observers expect the climate change legislation
currently being drafted in the PRC to include both a carbon tax
and a cap-and-trade program,47 the two implementation
strategies that continue to dominate efforts to reduce
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in the West.48
Meanwhile, the many Western-style policy design principles
and implementation strategies around which the PRC’s
environmental laws largely revolve, which in the West are
expressed with great legal precision, have been filtered through a
purportedly modern variant of a traditional Chinese approach to
statutory drafting that prizes both the “general” (yuanzexing) and
the “flexible” (linghuoxing).49 The aim of this approach is to
ensure that national laws can be implemented throughout the
PRC but also adapted to local conditions.50 The result is a
curious amalgam of obviously Western and characteristically
Chinese elements that on its face ensnares both regulated parties
and administrative officials in a labyrinth of universally
applicable but vaguely articulated Western-style substantive and
procedural requirements.
Directive 2008/98, Waste, art. 3(2), annex III, 2008 O.J. (L 312) 3, 9, 25-26 (EC),
and Council Directive 91/689, Hazardous Waste, art. 1(4), annexes I-III, 1991
O.J. (L 377) 20, 20-21, 23-27 (EEC), repealed by Council Directive 2008/98,
Waste, 2008 O.J. (L 312) 3 (EC).
46. Compare PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 88, § 6 (defining
"treatment"), with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 1004(34),
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2006) (defining "treatment").
47. See Michael Standaert, China: Draft Climate Law Expected in China;
Change in Leadership Could Slow Other Initiatives, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. S-37
(2012). The Central Government already has approved pilot cap-and-trade
programs to be launched in several provinces and municipalities. Michael
Standaert, Emissions Trading: Carbon Trading in Seven Chinese Localities to
Inform Choice for Nationwide System, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. 74 (2012) [hereinafter
Standaert 01/18/12].
48. See, e.g., Stephen Gardner, Emissions Trading: European Commission
Proposes to Link EU, Swiss Emissions Trading Schemes, 33 INT'L ENV'T REP.
1126 (2010); Eduard Goldberg, Emissions Trading: New Zealand Announces
Trading Scheme for Carbon Emissions; Abandons Carbon Tax, 30 INT'L ENV'T
REP. 769 (2007); Jeremy Hainsworth, Taxes: British Columbia Carbon Tax Wins
Positive Reviews for Reducing Greenhouse Emissions, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. 646
(2012).
49. See Keller, supra note 20, at 749, 749 n.191.
50. Id. at 749.
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Unfortunately, this nominally Chinese but heavily law-based,
essentially Western approach to mitigating the negative
environmental impacts of industrialization has fallen short of its
promise in the PRC.51 Regulated parties–usually industrial
enterprises–routinely flout the law, often with the collusion of
local officials.52 Institutional factors are partly to blame, at least
with respect to enforcement.
By statute, the PRC’s
environmental laws are enforced by local Environmental
Protection Bureaus (EPBs), each of which is an arm of the local
government that exists at the corresponding administrative level
of the State.53 These local EPBs are also legally subordinate to
51. Cf. Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China:
Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 203 (2007) (arguing that the
generally accepted view that "China's environmental laws are relatively
complete and that enforcement is now the real problem" is only partly true
because those laws are inherently weak in certain respects).
52. See, e.g., ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 5-6, 7, 75, 115; Michael Standaert,
Enforcement: Enforcement of Environmental Laws in China Hindered by Local
Officials' Focus on Growth, 34 INT'L ENV'T REP. 255 (2011) [hereinafter
Standaert 03/02/11].
53. Song Ying, The Chinese Environmental Lawmaking Framework, 1
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 225, 231 (2002). Cf., e.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, arts. 105,
115 (1982) ("Local people's governments at different levels are the executive
bodies of local organs of state power as well as the local organs of state
administration at the corresponding level."). The PRC is a unitary state in
which neither the separation of powers nor federalism plays a role. See id.
pmbl., cl. 3, arts. 30, 57 (1982); but see RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 81 (2002) (arguing that as a result of economic
reforms that have devolved both authority and responsibility to local
governments in the PRC, "authority has become fragmented to such an extent
that China arguably now has a de facto federalist form of government."). In a
pattern that even the Chinese Emperors would have recognized, however, the
central authorities have dispersed the power of the State as a strategy for coping
with the challenges of governing such a big country, both as a matter of policy
and as a matter of law. See id. at 189, 241. Cf. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A
CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 16-17 (1999) (describing in general
the administrative subdivision of the Chinese empire down to the county level,
and the tendency of the Chinese Emperors to rule indirectly through local elites,
thus stretching the state resources available to govern such a large country).
The PRC Constitution divides the State into a complex network of eleven
different types of nested administrative units. See PRC CONST., supra note 5,
art. 30 (1982). Cf. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The World Factbook, East
and Southeast Asia: China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ ch.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2013) (listing the numbers,
Chinese-language designations, and proper names of certain administrative
subdivisions of the PRC). All of these administrative subdivisions qualify as
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the Central Government’s Ministry of Environmental Protection,
but depend on the local governments of which they are a part for
most of their funding, among other resources, and therefore tend
to be more responsive to them than to their nominal superiors in
Beijing.54 At the same time, powerful political incentives have
encouraged local governments to pursue economic development at
almost any cost,55 regardless of what environmental laws
require.56
Beyond this institutional problem, however, lies a more basic
cultural one, with profound implications for both enforcement and
compliance. It is here that the Chinese legal tradition plays a
pivotal role. In this context, the term legal tradition refers to “a
set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the
nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity,
about the proper organization and operation of a legal system,
and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected, and taught.”57 A society’s legal tradition doubles as the
core of its legal culture.58 A society’s legal system is the set of
"local" under PRC law. Cf., e.g., Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses
and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China (adopted by
the Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No. 1 of the
Chairman Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 4, 1979, effective Jan. 1,
1980, as amended for the fourth time by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Oct. 27, 2004), art. 18, paras. 1-2, translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST.,
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/
cn/legis/cen/laws/olotlpcalpgotproc908/ (P.R.C.) (referring to various levels of
"local" government in prescribing procedures for submitting bills and proposals
to local people's congresses).
54. See ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 113.
55. Cf. Canfa, supra note 24, at 171 (noting that GDP has been "the primary
standard against which the achievements of local governments are measured"
since 1992).
56. See, e.g., Lixin Gu & William R. Sheate, Institutional Challenges for EIA
Implementation in China: A Case Study of Development Versus Environmental
Protection, 36 ENVTL. ASSESSMENT 125 (2005); Standaert 03/02/11, supra note
52.
57. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 2 (3d ed. 2007).
58. See id. ("The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of
which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural
perspective."). By culture, I mean the set of descriptive and prescriptive beliefs
and associated behaviors that together define a distinct way of life for the
members of a given social group in a given domain of experience, and are
transmitted socially between generations. This definition falls squarely within

13

2013]

CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

1169

institutions through which the society’s legal tradition and the
broader legal culture of which it is a part are expressed.59
The most widespread and influential legal traditions
worldwide are the civil law tradition and the common law
tradition.60 The former is rooted historically in the law of the
ancient Roman republic, and dominates in Europe, Latin
America, and much of Asia and Africa.61 The latter dates from
the Norman conquest of England, and is found in Great Britain
and its former colonies.62 The Chinese legal tradition predates
the Roman civil law by as many as several centuries, and has
been as influential throughout East Asia as the civil law and
common law traditions have been in other parts of the world.63
Although this legal tradition is uniquely Chinese, it resembles its
civil law counterpart in crucial respects.64 As is almost always
the case in civil law jurisdictions, enacted law is and always has
been the only formal source of law in China.65 Moreover, much
like the courts in civil law jurisdictions, Chinese courts almost
never have had the authority to interpret this enacted law, and
never have had the authority to render decisions with
precedential effect, although judicial decisions have served as
informal guidance for courts in other cases since China’s imperial
the scope of the ordinary usage of the term. See John Gerring & Paul A. Barresi,
Culture: Joining Minimal Definitions and Ideal-Types, in CONCEPTS AND
METHOD IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE TRADITION OF GIOVANNI SARTORI 241 (David
Collier & John Gerring eds., 2009).
59. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 2 ("A legal tradition .
. . is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about . . . the
proper organization and operation of a legal system, [among other things] . . . .
The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial
expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective.").
60. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 98-118, 218-37 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
61. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 2-3.
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. See JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNASTIC CHINA 3-4
(2005).
64. Cf. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 4 (noting that many
Chinese jurists think of China as a civil law jurisdiction, but emphasizing that
comparative lawyers recognize a distinct East Asian legal tradition).
65. Compare id. at 24-25 (listing the sources of law in the civil law tradition),
with HEAD & WANG, supra note 63 (surveying the legal codes of the Chinese
empire), and LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 145 ("According to Chinese law and
doctrine, the sole source of legal rules is legislation . . . .” ).
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era.66 Yet despite these superficial similarities, the Chinese and
civil law traditions have been shaped by fundamentally different
historical and cultural factors. Whereas the modern civil law
tradition is primarily an expression of the ideology of the French
Revolution and nineteenth-century German legal science,67 the
Chinese legal tradition has been shaped primarily by indigenous
historical and cultural phenomena.68
This Article argues that the Chinese legal tradition is
essentially a Confucian legal tradition, and that its Confucian
attributes significantly constrain the effectiveness of the
Western-style environmental laws enacted by the PRC in recent
decades. Part I explores the emergence of a Confucian legal
tradition in China and its impact on Chinese legal culture before
the founding of the PRC. Part II highlights some of the impacts
of this tradition on the Chinese legal system during the same
period. Part III makes a case for the endurance of the Confucian
essence of this legal tradition in the PRC itself, and highlights its
implications for the effectiveness of the PRC’s Western-style
environmental laws.
This Article concludes with a few
preliminary strategic suggestions for making the PRC’s
environmental law and policy regime more effective by aligning it
more closely with the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal
tradition.

66. Compare MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 23-25, 46-47
(describing the implications of the civil law tradition's conception of the sources
of law for the limited scope of the judicial function), with LUBMAN, supra note 53,
at 23, 281-85 (describing the historic and contemporary role of cases in Chinese
law); but cf. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 42-46, 47
(describing the tension between theory and practice with respect to the judicial
function in civil law jurisdictions).
67. See, e.g., MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 15-19, 61-67.
68. Cf. id. at 4 (noting that some observers have suggested the existence of a
Confucian legal tradition in East Asia).
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THE EMERGENCE OF A CONFUCIAN LEGAL
TRADITION IN CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON
CHINESE LEGAL CULTURE BEFORE THE
FOUNDING OF THE PRC

The emergence of a Confucian legal tradition in China is
integrally bound up with the origin and early history of China
itself. Law per se–or fa69–almost never has played more than a
subordinate role in maintaining social and political order in
China.70 It played a dominant role only during the Qin (Ch’in)
Dynasty (221-206 B.C.E.),71 after Ying Zheng (Ying Cheng)–the
ruler of the Chinese kingdom of Qin–finally unified the country
after nearly 200 years of warfare among several Chinese states.72
The Qin’s fa-based approach to governance–known as the
Legalist or School of Law (fa jia) tradition–was not a new
invention, having emerged almost 200 years earlier in the
Chinese Kingdom of Zhou (Chou).73 The Qin’s embrace of this
strategy was deeply unpopular, however, and did not last for
long.74 After only fifteen years, the Qin were overthrown by the
founder of what became the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.).75

69. Fa means the positive or written law in the abstract, although it also can
be used to refer to individual laws. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN
IMPERIAL CHINA 11 (1967). The term connotes a standard of behavior to which
ordinary people must conform because it has been imposed on them by superior
authority. See id.
70. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 48 (noting the low esteem in which the
Chinese always have held law as a means of achieving social order).
71. With rare exceptions, which are described infra, this article romanizes
Chinese names and other Chinese nouns according to the pinyin system,
followed parenthetically in the first instance by the Wade-Giles equivalent, if
different. Some Chinese names have become so familiar to Western audiences
either in their Wade-Giles form (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek), as Latinized equivalents
of the Chinese (i.e., Confucius, Mencius), or in some other romanized form (i.e.,
Sun Yat-sen) that this article uses the more familiar forms, followed
parenthetically in the first instance either by the pinyin or by both the pinyin
and the Wade-Giles romanizations, in that order, as appropriate. The diacritical
marks indicating the tones that would distinguish among what otherwise would
be homonyms in spoken Chinese have been omitted from all romanizations.
72. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 63-75.
73. See id. at 45-48.
74. See id. at 73, 75.
75. See id. at 76-77. Strictly speaking, the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220
C.E.) was comprised of two distinct dynasties -- the Former Han (206 B.C.E.-8
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For most of the 2,200 years since then, Confucian behavioral
norms–or li76–have been much more important than fa as a
means of maintaining social and political order in China.77 These
li encompass the full range of institutions and relationships that
Confucianists believe are necessary to maintain social and
political harmony.78
A pre-Confucian form of the li performed this function among
the members of the Zhou aristocracy in the middle of the second
millennium B.C.E.79 Confucius (Kung Fuzi or K’ung-fu-tzu) (551479 B.C.E.) built upon the Zhou li by expanding the li concept to
encompass relations among all members of society, by
emphasizing that government should be based almost solely on
the li instead of on fa, and by arguing that the authority to
govern therefore ought to be vested in scholars who had
demonstrated their mastery of the li.80 The most influential of
Confucius’s early disciples–Mencius (Mengzi or Meng-tzu) (372289 B.C.E. or 390-305 B.C.E.) and Xunzi (Hsun-tzu) (313-238
B.C.E.)81–modified Confucius’s own philosophy in the centuries
between his death and China’s unification by positing that the
function of the li was to maintain the inherent stratification of
society, and that punishment should play a greater role in

C.E.) and the Later Han (25-220 C.E.) -- separated by a brief interregnum that
scholars generally discount as historically insignificant. See id. at 77-82.
76. Strictly speaking, li means "rites" or "ritual." D. C. Lau, Introduction to
CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS ix, xxxviii (D. C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1992).
77. See, e.g., EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EAST ASIA: THE
GREAT TRADITION 30 (1960).
78. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 19.
79. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 23-24, 28-30.
80. Id. at 32. For the classic statement of Confucius's own teachings, see
CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (D. C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press 2d ed. 1992).
81. For more than 1,000 years, Mencius's contribution to the Confucian
tradition has been recognized officially in China as second in importance only to
that of Confucius himself. D. C. Lau, Introduction to MENCIUS, MENCIUS ix, ix
(D.C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter Lau on
Mencius]. Strictly speaking, Mencius's name was Mengke (Meng K'o), and
Mencius merely the title of his book, see MENCIUS, MENCIUS (D.C. Lau trans.,
Chinese Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003), but the one has come to be known by the
title of the other. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 41 n.46. Xunzi, who is the
only other great figure in early Confucianism, had much less influence on later
scholars. Lau on Mencius, supra note 81, at ix-x.
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governance than Confucius himself preferred as a supplement to
leadership by moral example based on the li.82
The most enduring form of Confucianism emerged about a
century later during the reign of Emperor Wudi (Wuti) (141-87
B.C.E.), who presided over the golden age of the Former Han
Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-8 C.E.).83 Emperor Wudi had been educated
in the Confucian classics, the oldest of which were already many
centuries old,84 so it was natural that he should turn to a
Confucian scholar–Dong Zhongshu (Tung Chung-shu) (ca. 179104 B.C.E.)–to articulate a clear rationale for the Emperor’s claim
to be the legitimate, sole ruler over all of China.85 Dong rose to
the challenge by reinventing Confucianism as an imperialist
amalgam that blended the preexisting form with elements of the
This
Legalist tradition, Daoism, and other cosmologies.86
“imperial Confucianism”87 would play an indispensable role in
reinforcing the imperial system for the next 2,000 years.88
The li of imperial Confucianism were derived from the basic
Confucian conception of a naturally harmonious cosmic order
inhabited by human beings who are naturally rational, whether
or not they are naturally good,89 and who therefore are capable of

82. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 41-45; see also MENCIUS, supra note 81,
at bk. IV, pt. A, ¶ 1 (quoting Mencius as affirming, "Goodness alone is not
sufficient for government; The law unaided cannot make itself effective."). Cf. id.
(quoting Mencius as saying, "When those above have no principles and those
below have no laws, . . . then it is good fortune indeed if a state survives.").
83. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 32, 78-79, 86-87. For the
relationship between the Former and Later Han dynasties, see supra note 75.
84. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 87. For brief histories and
summaries of the Confucian classics and their relationship to Confucianism per
se, see REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 64-67, 68.
85. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-87. Cf. BRADLEY SMITH & WAN-GO
WENG, CHINA: A HISTORY IN ART 79 (1973) (describing the mutually beneficial
"meeting of the minds" of Emperor Wudi and Dong Zhongshu).
86. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-91; see also REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK,
supra note 77, at 105-07 (explaining the "philosophical syncretism" of Han-era
Confucianism, and noting Dong Zhongshu's rise to prominence in Wudi's court).
87. See, e.g., HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-91.
88. Cf., e.g., REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 107-08 (attributing
the superior longevity of the Chinese empire partly to the incorporation of
imperial Confucianism into the Chinese State).
89. See, e.g., HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 49 box II-1, 88-89. Mencius
and Xunzi disagreed about whether human beings are naturally good, although
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learning the virtuous behaviors needed to maintain social
stability and, thus, to preserve cosmic harmony.90 These li vary
in accordance with a person’s age and social rank, primarily in
the context of the five principal Confucian social relationships–
ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother
and younger brother, and friend and friend91–of which the first
three are the most important.92 In general, rulers should be
benevolent whereas subjects should be loyal; fathers should be
compassionate whereas sons should be filial; elder brothers
should be kind whereas younger brothers should be respectful;
husbands should be righteous whereas wives should be
submissive; and friends should be faithful.93 The li derive their
legitimacy from their role in reinforcing the harmonious cosmic
order of which the stratification of society is an expression.94
Society both ensures its own stability and preserves cosmic
harmony by socializing its members to behave in accordance with
the li.95 The Emperor’s own behavior plays an indispensable role
in this dynamic.96 As the ultimate behavioral exemplar, the
later Confucian scholars sided with Mencius in believing that they are. See, e.g.,
REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 80-81.
90. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 35-36, 41-44, 49 box II-1, 88-89. Cf.
MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. VI, pt. A, ¶ 6 (quoting Mencius as affirming the
inherent capacity of human beings to become good).
91. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20, 21.
92. Cf. SMITH & WENG, supra note 85, at 79 (noting Dong Zhongshu's view
that social stability depends on the relationships between ruler and subject,
father and son, and husband and wife).
93. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 49 box II-1; see also MENCIUS, supra note
81, at bk. I, pt. A, ¶ 5, bk. III, pt. A, ¶ 4, bk. III, pt. B, ¶ 2, bk. VI, pt. B, ¶ 7
(quoting Mencius on proper behavior, duties, and the nature of certain social
relationships).
94. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20-21. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note
80, at bk. I, ¶ 12 (quoting one of Confucius's disciples with approval as saying,
"Of the things brought about by the rites [li], harmony is the most valuable.").
Only the Confucian relationship of friend to friend implies a measure of social
equality. See DANIEL C. K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 43 (2003). Cf. MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. III, pt. A,
¶ 4 (quoting Mencius as characterizing the relationship between friends as
based on "faith").
95. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20, 21. Cf. MENCIUS, supra note
81, at bk. IV, pt. A, ¶ 1, bk. VII, pt. B, ¶ 32 (quoting Mencius on the relevance of
the li to the preservation of the State and the order of the Empire).
96. Cf. JEROME CH'ÊN, YUAN SHIH-K'AI 200 (1961) ("[O]nly the Emperor, the
son of Heaven, might intercede with Heaven for his people.").
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Emperor is the linchpin of social stability,97 and thus of cosmic
harmony. An Emperor who fails to fulfill this role by failing to
observe the li forfeits the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) from
which his authority is derived, and thus forfeits the right to
rule.98
Imperial Confucianism–either with or without its explicitly
imperial trappings, which are not especially relevant here–
implies a distinctly Confucian legal tradition with distinctly
Confucian conceptions of the nature of law and its role in society
and the polity. With respect to the nature of law, this Confucian
legal tradition makes a basic moral distinction between the li and
fa. The li are of universal moral validity because they were
derived from human nature and the cosmic order by the ancient
savants.99 Fa has no moral validity because it is merely a
modern human construct intended to serve as an ad hoc source of
political power.100 This basic moral distinction has important
implications for the role of law in society and the polity. A
government based on the persuasive power of the li is virtuous,
whereas a government based on the compulsive power of fa is
merely tyrannical.101 A government based on the li is also
harmonious because the li are unwritten and therefore can be
adapted to fit any circumstance,102 and because a ruler who
governs through the li is capable of winning the loyalty of his
subjects by force of moral example.103 A government based on fa

97. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 31-32; see also MENCIUS, supra note
81, at bk. IV, pt. A, ¶ 20 (quoting Mencius as saying, "When the prince is
benevolent, everyone else is benevolent; when the prince is dutiful, everyone else
is dutiful; when the prince is correct, everyone else is correct. Simply by
rectifying the prince one can put the state on a firm basis."). Cf. CONFUCIUS,
supra note 80, at bk. XVI, ¶ 2 (quoting Confucius as saying, "When the Way
prevails in the Empire, the rites . . . are initiated by the Emperor.").
98. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 18 box I-3, 28-29. Cf. MENCIUS,
supra note 81, at bk. V, pt. A, ¶ 5 (quoting Mencius as explaining how only
Heaven can give the Empire to the Emperor).
99. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20-21.
100. Id. at 21.
101. See id. at 20.
102. See id. at 21.
103. See id. at 20. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. XII, ¶ 17 (quoting
Confucius as saying, "Government (cheng) is being correct (cheng). If you give a
lead in being correct, who would dare to be incorrect?") (footnote omitted);
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lacks harmony, however, and merely sows contention in
society.104 Although fa is sufficiently coercive to ensure that the
people comply with its formal requirements, it is incapable of
ensuring that they abide by its spirit because it fosters no inner
loyalty to the State.105
This Confucian legal tradition leaves little room for law as a
means of maintaining social or political order, except as a fallback
strategy to be used in isolated instances to restore social–and
therefore, cosmic–harmony by punishing the few social deviants
who fail to conform to the li.106 Hence the traditional Chinese
proverb that law is meant for the base person, but not for the
gentleman.107 Moreover, the resort to law by either individuals
or the State is by definition a departure from the social and
cosmic harmony that the law’s enforcement seeks to restore.108
The resort to law is also an admission of moral failure–on the
part of individuals, society, and the State, unlike in Western legal
traditions.109 In accordance with these features of the Confucian
MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. II, pt. A, ¶ 3, bk. III, pt. A, ¶ 3 (quoting Mencius
on how a true king teaches the people to be affectionate).
104. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 21.
105. See id. at 20, 21. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. II, ¶ 3 (quoting
Confucius as saying, "Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with
punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no
sense of shame."); MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. II, pt. A, ¶ 3 (quoting Mencius
as saying, "When people submit to force they do so not willingly but because
they are not strong enough. When people submit to the transforming influence
of morality they do so sincerely, with admiration in their hearts.").
106. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 3, 4; Franz Michael, The Role of Law
in Traditional, Nationalist and Communist China, CHINA Q., Jan.-Mar. 1962, at
124, 128. See generally BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 43-48, 50 (exploring
and summarizing the traditional Chinese view of law as a means of repairing
violations of the social order and, thus, of cosmic harmony, and offering
illustrations from various imperial legal codes).
107. Cf. Yu Xingzhong, Comment, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic
of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 29, 32 (1989) (attributing the proverb to the traditional
Chinese belief that the only purpose of law is "to deter the potentially evil").
108. Cf. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 43 (arguing that the traditional
Chinese view of law "primarily as an instrument for redressing violations of the
social order . . . could hardly have started with the Confucians, at least the early
Confucians, since law to them was itself a violation of the social order.").
109. See Michael, supra note 106, at 124-26, 128. Cf. REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK,
supra note 77, at 84 ("Whereas Western law has been conceived of as a human
embodiment of some higher order of God or nature, the law of the Legalists [in
imperial China] represented only the ruler's fiat.").
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legal tradition, most of the Emperor’s subjects viewed the
imperial fa as both morally vacuous and inherently unpleasant,
and of little relevance to their daily lives.110 Their antipathy
toward the law was matched only by their aversion to the local
magistrate’s office (yamen), which functioned as the local imperial
court.111 The dead should stay out of hell, went an imperial
Chinese saying, and the living should stay out of yamens.112
The Empire endured for more than 2,100 years, from the
unification of China by the Qin in 221 B.C.E. until the abdication
of the last Emperor of the Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty (1644-1912) in
February 1912.113 It was succeeded for a few decades by a
nominal republic,114 in which similarly Confucian attitudes
toward law prevailed.115 The Chinese of the early Republican era

110. See REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 84. Cf. BODDE & MORRIS,
supra note 69, at 3-4, 5-6 (explaining how "Chinese traditional society . . . was
by no means a legally oriented society" in that the behavior of ordinary Chinese
people was constrained much more by Confucian ethical principles than by law);
JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG, EAST ASIA: THE
MODERN TRANSFORMATION 624 (1965) ("[L]aw had been neither primary nor
pervasive in [imperial] Chinese society."); PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 39
(explaining why many people in imperial China considered participating in a
lawsuit to be disgraceful, and preferred to use informal means of dispute
resolution instead).
111. See LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 23. Cf. ARTHUR H. SMITH, CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS 238 (13th ed. 1894) (noting the tendency of the literati to be
terrified in the presence of a district magistrate, even in cases that do not
concern them personally). Local magistrates, who performed the imperial
analog of what Westerners would consider to be a judicial function, among many
other functions, were the all-purpose administrative representatives of the
Emperor at the local level. William C. Jones, Introduction to THE GREAT QING
CODE 1, 9-10 (William C. Jones trans., 1994).
112. SMITH, supra note 111, at 214.
113. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 640-41;
REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 85-92. Cf. PERCY HORACE KENT, THE
PASSING OF THE MANCHUS 310-16 (photo. reprint 1977) (1912) (recounting the
abdication of the last Qing Emperor).
114. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 642-717,
848-60.
115. Cf. PAUL S. REINSCH, AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 117, 177, 291-92
(1922) (remarking on the limited role of written laws and "set tribunals" in
Chinese life, and quoting a prominent Chinese official as explaining that
abstract legal thinking and "hard-and-fast" Western ideas of legality in relations
between the central government and regional governments are foreign to the
Chinese way of thinking).
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were “[n]ot much given to legal refinements,”116 as one
knowledgeable Westerner observed, and resented the careful
draftsmanship of the American contract lawyers employed by the
American engineers and financiers who flocked to China to profit
from its government’s efforts to modernize the country’s
infrastructure.117 Steeped for millennia in a Confucian legal
tradition, the Americans’ Chinese partners had become
accustomed to doing business without the benefit of written
contracts.118 By the twilight of the Republic, this antipathy
toward the law remained unchanged.119 As late as the 1940s,
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), the last supreme leader of the
Republic on the mainland,120 felt compelled to exhort his
compatriots that they must “habituate [them]selves to rule by
law” so that they could “accomplish the task of establishing
[their] state on the basis of law.”121 Meanwhile, Chiang himself
was invoking the wisdom of the ancient Confucian sages for the
proposition that morality ought to be ontologically prior to law in
the maintenance of the Chinese polity.122

116. Id. at 208.
117. See id. at 208-09.
118. Cf. SUN YAT-SEN, SAN MIN CHU I: THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE
WITH TWO SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK 40 (Frank W. Price
trans., Comm'n for the Compilation of the History of the Kuomintang ed., n.d.)
(explaining that no contract is needed when a foreigner places an order for goods
in China because the Chinese use "verbal [sic] promises" rather than written
contracts in their business relations).
119. Cf. PAN WEI-TUNG, THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF FORTY YEARS
OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN CHINA 133 (1945) (observing during the late Chinese
Republic that China has been governed for 2,300 years more by Confucian
morality than by "formal law").
120. See generally JONATHON FENBY, CHIANG KAI-SHEK: CHINA'S
GENERALISSIMO AND THE NATION HE LOST (2004). Chiang and his government
were driven from the mainland by the Communists in 1949 after a protracted
civil war. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 859-60.
121. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA'S DESTINY 211 (Wang Chung-hui trans., 1947).
122. See id. at 203. Cf. FENBY, supra note 120, at 184 (describing Chiang as
caught between his desire to modernize China and his insistence on the primacy
of Confucian principles and behavioral norms).
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II. IMPACTS OF THE CONFUCIAN LEGAL
TRADITION ON THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
BEFORE THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC
The attitudes about the nature of law and its role in society
and the polity at the center of the Confucian legal tradition imply
certain attitudes about the proper organization and operation of a
legal system. China’s legal system reflected these attitudes for
millennia before the founding of the PRC.123 For example, there
was much less law in imperial China than there was in the West
during the same period.124 Moreover, what law there was in
China was overwhelmingly punitive.125 For example, it was
typical for the complainant, the accused, and all witnesses to be
imprisoned under horrific conditions for the duration of any legal
proceeding in which they were involved.126 The interrogation of
witnesses or other law-abiding persons in connection with legal
proceedings often involved torture.127 Even the least severe legal
123. Cf. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 228-29 (characterizing the history of
legal codification in imperial China through the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in
1912 as "a form of legal conservatism – a conserving of . . . the LegalistConfucianist alloy[] that had emerged from the Qin-Han period.”).
124. Cf. LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 19-20 (noting the dearth of commercial law
in the Chinese imperial law codes, and the extent to which the terms of
commercial transactions were governed by custom); PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note
119, at 133 (arguing that China has been governed for ages less by "formal law"
than by "a sense of morality and reason").
125. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 219-20. Cf. KENT, supra note 113, at
69 (describing how the authorities in imperial China have a great advantage
over troublemakers in "a country where there are no niceties of judicial process
and vengeance is swift and sure."). For insights into the ancient Chinese
association of law (fa) with punishment (xing), especially corporal punishment,
both conceptually and as a matter of legal usage, see BODDE & MORRIS, supra
note 69, at 11-12.
126. Jones, supra note 111, at 11. Cf. THE GREAT QING CODE art. 396, § 1, art.
407 (William C. Jones trans., 1994) (addressing the imprisonment of law-abiding
persons interrogated about public matters under investigation with which they
are involved indirectly, and the unduly prolonged imprisonment of
complainants).
127. See Jones, supra note 111, at 11. Cf. THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note
126, art. 396, § 2 (referring to "putting [witnesses] to the question" and in
certain circumstances "interrogation under torture . . . carried out according to
the law" with respect to law-abiding persons indirectly involved with public
matters under investigation). See generally SMITH, supra note 111, at 214
(describing some of the "dreadful tortures which are inflicted upon Chinese
prisoners in the name of justice.").

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6

24

1180

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

punishment meted out by the magistrate–a beating with a light
bamboo rod–could be crippling, if not deadly.128 In a society that
considered Confucian behavioral norms to be the morally
preferable means of maintaining social and political order, and in
which law functioned merely as a fallback strategy for restoring
social and cosmic harmony by punishing the few social deviants
who failed to conform to the li, the punitive character of the
imperial fa ought not to be surprising.129 Its principal purpose
was to enable the magistrate to identify the proper punishment
for any legally significant transgression against the Emperor or
the social order for which he was responsible, which was the only
type of behavior to which the fa applied.130 The punitive
character of the imperial fa was primarily what led the Western
powers to insist on the principal of extraterritoriality for their
own nationals in the unequal treaties that they forced upon the
Chinese beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century.131 As
late as the 1940s, Westerners in China still were subject to
Western law rather than Chinese law, as was their real and
personal property.132
The laws with which the Western powers were concerned
comprised only a small part of the imperial fa, however. In
accordance with the Confucian conception of law as merely a

128. See Jones, supra note 111, at 11. Cf. THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note
126, art. 1 (defining the five basic punishments applicable in various degrees to
the universe of legal transgressions).
129. Cf. supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (explaining the moral
distinction between the li and fa and the implications of that distinction for the
roles of the li and fa in society and the polity in the Confucian legal tradition).
130. See Jones, supra note 111, at 12-13, 24.
131. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 144-46, but cf.
BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 41-43 (noting various respects in which the
imperial fa was more humane that its Western analog, both on its face and as
applied).
132. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 714. The legal
modernization efforts undertaken by the central government of the nominal
republic that followed the Empire's collapse were in part a response to the
refusal of the Western Powers to abandon the principle of extraterritoriality
unless China reformed its criminal laws. See VICTOR H. LI, LAW WITHOUT
LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 20
(1978).
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source of political power,133 most of the imperial fa focused on
ensuring that the Emperor’s bureaucrats performed their duties
properly, and on punishing them when they did not.134 Very little
fa applied to relations among private individuals, and then only
insofar as those relations impinged upon the interests of the
Emperor.135 Even this fa applied to private matters only through
the agency of the State, such that a private party with what in
the West would be viewed as a civil claim against another private
party would complain to the Emperor’s bureaucrats, who would
decide whether or not to take legal action against the alleged
wrongdoer.136 No fa at all applied to the Emperor himself, whose
authority to rule was a function of his position at the apex of the
Confucian social hierarchy believed to be an expression of the
natural cosmic order, and who therefore was beyond the reach of
purely human institutions such as law.137

133. Cf. supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (contrasting the moral
validity and related implications of the li and fa in the Confucian legal
tradition).
134. See Jones, supra note 111, at 6-7, 9, 11. Cf. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63,
at 222 (emphasizing that the "audience" of the dynastic legal codes was the
imperial bureaucracy).
135. Jones, supra note 111, at 6; see BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 4
(explaining how imperial Chinese law was concerned primarily with acts that
seemed disruptive of the social order, and only secondarily with defending the
rights of citizens against each other). But cf. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at
222-25 (arguing that if the Qing Code is viewed as being aimed primarily at
regulating the behavior of state bureaucrats, then it nevertheless addresses in
that context many of the same issues that in the West are private civil law
matters).
136. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 4.
137. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 41; see also LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 1517 (referring to the seemingly absolute power of the Emperor within the
authoritarian hierarchy of Chinese society in theory, but noting that the
Emperor's power also was limited in theory by his duty to implement the cosmic
order in accordance with the classic Confucian texts). But cf. WEN CHING, THE
CHINESE CRISIS FROM WITHIN 110-11 (G. M. Reith ed., 1901) (explaining how the
Emperor's power was absolute in theory but strictly circumscribed in practice
because the heir apparent was trained to respect the existing governmental
machinery and not to innovate). The Emperor would have remained almost
wholly above the law even under a plan for a constitutional monarchy endorsed
by imperial edict in the final years of the Empire. See KENT, supra note 113, at
39-40.
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Moreover, the imperial fa was pervaded by Confucian ethical
principles.138 The process of incorporating the latter into the
former began during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.), and
was complete by the time that the Tang (T’ang) Dynasty (618-907
C.E.) enacted its legal code in 653 C.E.139 The law remained
substantively Confucian through the collapse of the last imperial
dynasty in 1912,140 most notably in its treatment of different
persons differently–whether they were defendants, would-be
defendants, or convicted persons–depending on their status
within the Confucian social hierarchy, both in the abstract and
It also codified certain
relative to any injured parties.141
especially important Confucian social obligations, such as filial
piety.142 Moreover, the Confucian context in which the imperial
fa was enacted and applied lent its content a coherence that its
structure often lacked.143 Even Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung’s)
father once lost a lawsuit in the twilight of the imperial era
because his opponent offered the court a fitting quotation from
the Confucian classics.144
The efforts of Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang (Kuomintang)–
or National People’s Party145–to Westernize the legal system of
the nominal Republic that briefly succeeded the Empire marked

138. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 235; PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 38.
But cf. Jones, supra note 111, at 16-18 (acknowledging that "[t]here seems to be
no question that Confucianism did influence a large number of the . . .
provisions" of the Qing dynasty's codification of the imperial fa, but cautioning
that "[a]t present it seems that all one can say with certainty is that there is a
great deal of congruence between the rules of the [Qing] Code and the standards
of behavior advocated by Confucianists.").
139. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 29. For illustrations drawn from the
last imperial legal code, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912 C.E.) Code of 1740, see id.
at 29-43.
140. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 228-29.
141. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 29, 30, 33-38, 43; Jones, supra
note 111, at 16-17.
142. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 39-41.
143. See Keller, supra note 20, at 717.
144. EDGAR SNOW, RED STAR OVER CHINA 133 (rev. ed., Grove Press 1968)
(quoting Mao Zedong).
145. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 651. But see
KENT, supra note 113, at 36 n*. (offering an alternative origin and original
meaning of what became the party's name).
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only a superficial departure from this Confucian pattern.146 After
consolidating its rule over central China in the late 1920s, the
Guomindang enacted several legal codes of German-inspired
design.147 These and related legal reforms had little impact on
Chinese society, however, both because the writ of the
Guomindang never extended much beyond the big cities that it
controlled, and even there often failed to ensure compliance with
the new laws, and because the domestic chaos and foreign wars
that plagued the brief life of the Republic otherwise prevented
effective implementation.148 Even at the apex of the social order,
the Westernized law adopted by the Republican authorities–even
before the Guomindang’s comprehensive reform efforts–had about
as much impact as had the imperial fa, which is to say very little.
Within two years of his inauguration, the Republic’s first
permanent President–Yuan Shikai (Yüan Shih-k’ai)149–secured

146. The Guomindang's efforts echoed a similar attempt made during the final
years of the Qing Dynasty, when would-be reformers convinced the powers
behind the throne to accept plans for establishing a putatively constitutional
monarchy and enacting several European-style legal codes and other laws. See
KENT, supra note 113, at 14, 164, 171, 191-92; PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at
4-7; Keller, supra note 20, at 717-18. These and other legal reform efforts
largely came to naught, however, both because traditionalists in the imperial
court tried to block their implementation, see KENT, supra note 113, at 161; PAN
WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 8-10; Keller, supra note 20, at 717, and because of
the chaos that followed the Empire's collapse. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at
43. Similar reform efforts endorsed a decade earlier by the Emperor himself had
failed because of similar internal opposition. See CHING, supra note 137, at 5657, 64-65, 165-66. Ironically, at least one scholar has argued that the earlier
reform movement was inspired by Confucianism. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 63-64.
147. Keller, supra note 20, at 718.
148. See id. at 718-19; Michael, supra note 106, at 133-34. Cf. FENBY, supra
note 120, at 230, 291 (noting "the absence of a proper legal system" as one of the
features of the Republic under Chiang, and the impact of the war with Japan on
the Republican government's centralization and modernization efforts); LI,
supra note 132, at 20 (doubting that the Republic's "instant modern Chinese
law" had much influence beyond the major centers of government and
commerce, and noting that publicizing and implementing it took a back seat to
the national government's efforts to deal with domestic turbulence and foreign
wars). Even in the early years of the Republic, the central government's
influence had not penetrated very deeply into Chinese society. See REINSCH,
supra note 115, at 321.
149. Yuan, who took the oath of office as the second Provisional President of
the Republic in March 1912, was elected and sworn in as the first permanent
President in October 1913. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 39, 171-72.
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the constitutional authority to wield absolute power.150
Subsequent changes to the presidential election law made it
possible for him to wield this power for life, and to pass it on to
one of his sons.151 As one Western chronicler observed, these
legal changes made Yuan “a minor Mussolini in a period when no
Mussolini had yet emerged for precedent.”152
The power of both Chiang Kai-shek, Yuan’s last successor on
the mainland,153 and the political party that he led, were only
slightly more constrained.154 As head of both the executive and
the military, Chiang effectively controlled the Republic’s central
government from an early date, although he did not assume the
presidency until May 1948, when he was inaugurated as the first
That
President under the Republic’s first Constitution.155
constitution,156 adopted nearly twenty years after Chiang’s
150. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 641, 646; see
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT OF 1914, art. 14 (Republic of China), translated in
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1914 56 (1922), reprinted as revised in PAN WEI-TUNG, THE
CHINESE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF FORTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN
CHINA 171 (1945) ("The President is the head of the Nation and combines in
himself all powers of government.").
151. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 201-02; PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 28-29;
see also FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 646 ("By the end of
1915 [Yuan] was president for life, emperor in all but name.").
152. LYON SHARMAN, SUN YAT-SEN: HIS LIFE AND ITS MEANING 203 (1934).
153. As a string of Communist victories in the protracted Chinese civil war
made the Guomindang's hold on the mainland increasingly untenable, President
Chiang purported to turn over power to his vice president without clearly
relinquishing the presidency, but continued to control events from behind the
scenes before fleeing the mainland to reestablish his government on the island
of Taiwan. See FENBY, supra note 120, at 488-98.
154. Cf. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 849 (arguing that
in Chiang Kai-shek, the "[Nationalist] party dictatorship [of the late Chinese
Republic] has its indispensable leader, the one man at the top to give final
answers."); FENBY, supra note 120, at 185-86 (observing that soon after the
Guomindang consolidated its power it became clear that China's legal system
would be subject to its interests); REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 298
(describing Chiang as the "indispensable foc[us] of final power, somewhat like
emperors of old.").
155. See Hungdah Chiu, Constitutional Development and Reform in the
Republic of China on Taiwan (with Documents) 9, 14 (OCCASIONAL
PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. No. 115, 1993); FENBY, supra
note 120, at 231, 390, 479.
156. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1947, as modified by temporary
provisions 1948-91, and amended 1991 & 1992), translated in Hungdah Chiu,
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consolidation of power over the parts of China controlled by the
Guomindang,157 formally confirmed the President’s expansive
powers.158 It also resurrected in nominally republican form an
ancient Chinese institution–the Censorate (yushitai, but later
duchayuan)–the principal function of which had been to uncover
and to report directly to the Emperor any failure of his
bureaucrats to fulfill their duties, although the censors also could
exercise the Confucian scholar’s prerogative of gently pointing out
to the Emperor any shortcomings in his own behavior.159
Although the revival of this institution–known in Republican
China as the Control Yuan (jiancha yuan)160–signified the
endurance of the Confucian preoccupation with using the law as a
means of policing the behavior of state bureaucrats,161 it signified
little if any retreat from the equally Confucian principle that the
supreme ruler is and should be above the law.162
The
Constitution purportedly subjected even the President to the
Control Yuan’s jurisdiction, but the “temporary” constitutional
provisions promulgated by Chiang’s government just ten days
before his inauguration, which were to be effective for the
duration of what the Guomindang considered to be a Communist

Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan
(with Documents) 42 (OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN
STUD. No. 115, 1993) [hereinafter ROC CONST., with the date of enactment of
provisions currently in force noted parenthetically].
157. Cf. FENBY, supra note 120, at 171 (noting Chiang's return with full
powers to the Republic's capital at Nanking (Nanjing or Nan-ching) in 1928
after an internal Guomindang power struggle).
158. See, e.g., ROC CONST., supra note 156, arts. 35-44 (1947, as amended and
supplemented 1991).
159. Compare id. arts. 90, 95-100 (1947, as amended 1992) (describing the
control powers of the Control Yuan), with REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note
77, at 168, 200-01, 274, 297-98, 368-69 (describing the role of the Censorate in
imperial China under the most important dynasties from the Tang through the
Qing).
160. See ROC CONST., supra note 156, art. 100 (1947, as amended 1992).
161. Cf. supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (noting the imperial fa's
Confucian preoccupation with ensuring that the Emperor's bureaucrats
performed their duties properly).
162. Cf. supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining how and why the
Chinese emperors were above the law in the context of the Confucian legal
tradition).
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rebellion, placed him all but beyond the censors’ reach.163 These
“temporary” provisions were not abrogated until 1991, more than
fifteen years after Chiang’s death in office and more than forty
years after he and his government fled the Chinese mainland for
the island of Taiwan.164 Both the first and last presidents of the
Chinese Republic on the mainland behaved almost instinctively
like their imperial predecessors,165 who were unfettered by
law,166 as one would expect in a society steeped for millennia in
an essentially Confucian legal tradition. More importantly,

163. See TEMPORARY [CONSTITUTIONAL] PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE DURING THE
PERIOD OF COMMUNIST REBELLION arts. 1-6, 8, 10 (1948, as amended 1960, 1966
& 1972) (abrogated 1991), translated in Hungdah Chiu, Constitutional
Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan (with Documents)
50 (OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. No. 115,
1993). Cf. Chiu, supra note 155, at 14 (describing the circumstances under
which the Temporary Provisions were adopted).
164. Chiu, supra note 155, at 31. See generally FENBY, supra note 120, at 497500 (briefly recounting Chiang's life from his flight to Taiwan in 1949 through
his death in office in 1975).
165. See FENBY, supra note 120, at 98; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 47;
SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 351. Cf. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 199-200
(describing certain imperial customs and rituals officially revived by Yuan);
RHODES FARMER, SHANGHAI HARVEST 168-69 (1945) (recounting an interview in
which Chiang declared, "I am the State."). See generally REINSCH, supra note
115, at 186 (paraphrasing a Chinese official of the early Republican era as
describing the government as essentially functioning like a monarchy
domestically). But cf. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 133, 201, 228 (quoting Yuan in a
message to Sun Yat-sen on the day of the Emperor's abdication as pledging
never to allow "monarchical Government" in China; citing him on another
occasion as pledging to Heaven and Earth that the monarchy would not be
restored in China as long as he lived; and describing the decree abolishing
Yuan's Empire, in which he claimed to have been manipulated by others into
assuming the throne); REINSCH, supra note 115, at 192-93 (recounting Yuan
Shikai's deathbed declaration that he had not wanted to become Emperor, but
had been tricked into believing that the public wanted it and that it was
necessary for the country). Mao carried on this tradition while candidly
acknowledging its ancient cultural roots, if disingenuously claiming to deplore
its effects. See Edgar Snow, A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung, LIFE, Apr. 30,
1971, at 46, 46. Cf. JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY
391 (2005) (“[Mao] was averse to law, and wanted there to be nothing that could
bind him."); HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 334 (2011) (characterizing Mao's style
of governance as that of "a traditional emperor of a majestic and awe-inspiring
kind"); REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 298 (describing Mao as the
"indispensable foc[us] of final power, somewhat like emperors of old.").
166. Supra note 137 and accompanying text (explaining the inapplicability of
the imperial fa to the emperors themselves).
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whatever superficially Western attributes the Chinese legal
system might have acquired as a result of Republican efforts
clearly were at odds with the Confucian attitudes toward law that
persisted among the general population throughout the
Republican era.167
The persistence of these attitudes was a natural consequence
of the endurance of essential elements of the imperial
Confucianism from which they were derived. Emperor Wudi
adopted this form of Confucianism as the official ideology of the
early Chinese State, and in 124 B.C.E. established an academy
for training candidates for government posts who would
demonstrate their fitness for office by passing a civil service
examination based on the classic Confucian texts.168
Confucianism retained this official status into the final years of
the last imperial dynasty–the Qing–which collapsed in 1912,
when the official examinations were stripped of their signature
Confucian requirement and then abolished altogether.169 Sun
Yat-sen (Sun Yixian or Sun I-hsien), the ostensibly Westernized
revolutionary who took the oath of office as Provisional President
of the Republic even before the Emperor’s abdication,170 offered a
harbinger of things to come, however, he reprised an ancient
ritual almost simultaneously with his successor’s election by
recounting the events of the revolution in a “prayer” to the spirit
of the founder of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) at the latter’s
tomb.171

167. Cf. supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text (arguing that Confucian
attitudes toward law endured throughout the Republican era).
168. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-87, 89, 90; REISCHAUER &
FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 106-07; but cf. id. at 101-08 (arguing that in
practice Wudi was almost as much of a Legalist as the Qin Dynasty Emperor
Ying Zheng had been, and that Confucianism emerged as the dominant ideology
of imperial China only slowly over the course of the Han Dynasty as a whole).
169. See KENT, supra note 113, at 15, 32-33; SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 7071; CHING, supra note 137, at 57-59. For a brief account of the collapse of the
Qing Dynasty, see FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 639-41.
170. See SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 133. Sun's propaganda and fund-raising
skills had played a pivotal role in the revolution that brought down the Qing. Id.
at 270-71. For an account of a pivotal phase in his ostensible Westernization,
see id. at 10-16.
171. See, e.g., id. at 140-43. Sources differ on the timing of this event.
Compare id. at 140 (placing it the day after the election of Sun's successor), with
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Less than two years after the Emperor’s abdication, Sun’s
successor–Yuan
Shikai–briefly
if
ineffectually
restored
Confucianism to official status, despite having failed the official
examinations repeatedly and not being much of a Confucianist
himself.172 Yuan performed the ancient imperial rites at the
Temple of Heaven, albeit with a few small changes meant to
symbolize China’s reinvention as a republic,173 but then went too
far by trying to have himself enthroned as Emperor.174 Military
leaders and provincial governors rebelled, leading Yuan to
renounce the throne a few months later.175 Less than a decade
after that, Sun Yat-sen called for a similar Confucian revival,
arguing that the key to governing China and to freeing it from
foreign control would be to revive its ancient political philosophy
in accordance with the Confucian classics.176 Sun’s erstwhile
protégé Chiang Kai-shek177 twice tried to restore Confucianism to
official status in the late Republican era, but with similarly
lackluster results.178
KENT, supra note 113, at 322 (placing it on the morning of the day of the election
of Sun's successor).
172. See CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 14, 15, 200; FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG,
supra note 110, at 640-41, 646, 649-50; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 23. Cf.
TEMPLE OF HEAVEN DRAFT [CONSTITUTION] of 1913 art. 19 (Republic of China),
translated in THE CHINA YEARBOOK 490 (H.G.W. Woodward ed., 1914), reprinted
as revised in PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 157-58 ("The people of the
Chinese Republic shall have the obligation to undergo primary education
according to law. In the education of citizens, the doctrine of Confucius shall be
adopted as the great principle for the regulation of persons.").
173. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 646; see also REINSCH,
supra note 115, at 24-26 (describing the imperial rites as performed by Yuan).
174. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 650; REINSCH,
supra note 115, at 171-75, 179.
175. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 228; FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note
110, at 651; PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 30; REINSCH, supra note 115, at
180, 182. Ironically, the name that had been chosen for Yuan's imperial reign
was Hong Xian (Hung Hsien) – or "Great Constitutional Era." Id. at 186.
176. See SUN YAT-SEN, supra note 118, at 41-44.
177. Cf. FENBY, supra note 120, at 56 (describing events that established
Chiang as a "loyal right-hand man for Sun," and as giving rise to their deep
personal rapport).
178. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 706, 713; FENBY,
supra note 120, at 246-47, 248. Cf. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, supra note 121, at 156,
186-87, 190-93 (expounding on the cultivation of traditional Confucian values as
essential to national salvation, and on the value of Confucianism as a means of
restoring order in the Chinese state); FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra
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The failure of these prominent efforts to restore
Confucianism to official status was a natural–perhaps inevitable–
consequence of the organic link between its former standing as
the official ideology of the Chinese State and the imperial system
per se, which had broken down irretrievably during the long, slow
collapse of the Qing.179 The success or failure of these efforts is
much less important, however, than the fact that throughout the
Republic’s brief life the Chinese people continued to live their own
lives more or less as they had done for millennia–that is, in
accordance with the Confucian behavioral norms that had served
as the touchstone of Chinese culture since the reign of Emperor
Wudi, albeit increasingly shorn of their specifically imperial
connotations.180 Mao Zedong considered Chinese culture to be so

note 110, at 717 (arguing that Chiang Kai-shek's losing quest to save China
from Communist domination "was damaged less by inadequacies of virtue than
by an excess of virtues that were out of date . . . . His inflexible rectitude
mirrored the inertia of a whole political tradition, still in the shadow of the
Confucian monarchy."); FENBY, supra note 120, at 253 ("[T]he nearest Chiang
came to expounding a creed was in a meld of Confucian classicism and
Methodism that had little relevance to the real problems facing the nation.").
179. Cf. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 649, 692, 713
(arguing that "the ancient Confucian ethical sanctions and the ceremonial forms
of imperial rule had lost their potency" by the early Republican era,
characterizing the "old domestic traditions" of China as "bankrupt" by the late
Republican era, and criticizing the Confucian "traditionalism" of Chiang Kaishek's political manifesto as "invok[ing] ideas even more out-of-date" than Mao
Zedong's rival ideology); REINSCH, supra note 115, at 272-85 (detailing the illfated attempt by an imperial general to restore the last Qing Emperor to the
throne, and asserting that both it and Yuan Shikai's earlier attempted
assumption of the throne "actually served to entrench more deeply the
republican form of government."); Keller, supra note 20, at 717 (arguing that
"[t]he upheavals of the nineteenth century brought an end to the dominance of
Confucian orthodoxy within China," which led many Chinese intellectuals to call
for a constitutional form of government); Michael, supra note 106, at 132-33
(noting that faith in the "Confucian system" largely had been lost even before
the collapse of the Qing); but cf. REINSCH, supra note 115, at 275 (describing
Beijing's population as showing "an almost joyous excitement" following the
brief restoration of the last Qing Emperor to the throne after the death of the
Republic's first permanent President).
180. Cf., e.g., REINSCH, supra note 115, at 24 (quoting the Minister of the
Interior of the early Republic on how it would be "dangerous" for the Republican
government "to neglect the worship of Heaven" because of the likely reaction of
the rural population in the event of a bad harvest). For Emperor Wudi's
contributions to the rise of Confucianism as the touchstone of traditional
Chinese culture, see supra notes 83-88, 168 and accompanying text.
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saturated with Confucianism that even before proclaiming the
founding of the PRC in 1949 he launched a decades-long crusade
to eradicate it.181
III. THE ENDURANCE OF THE CONFUCIAN
ESSENCE OF THE CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION
IN THE PRC, AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRC’S WESTERNSTYLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Like all cultural phenomena, legal traditions change over
time. “Culture moves rather like an octopus,” the anthropologist
Clifford Geertz once observed, “not all at once . . . but by
disjointed movements of this part, then that, and now the other
which somehow cumulate to directional change.”182 As a result,
no one should expect the Chinese legal tradition today to be the
same as it was during the Qing Dynasty, much less during the
Han. The Confucian essence of that tradition clearly has
endured, however, and has been reinforced by socialist legal
theory in at least one crucial respect. The endurance of this
Confucian essence is a function of the endurance of the broader
Confucian culture of which it is an expression,183 despite Mao’s
best efforts to purge the PRC of every Confucian influence.184
Mao’s professed hostility toward Confucianism had early
roots. Although the younger Mao studied the Confucian classics
in primary school, and also later under the tutelage of an elderly
scholar, he disliked them, and preferred to read just about
anything else.185 The elder Mao–who had attended only two
years of school but had become relatively prosperous by buying
181. See MAO TSE-TUNG, ON NEW DEMOCRACY 1 n.1, 59-60 (1954) [hereinafter
MAO TSE-TUNG ON NEW DEMOCRACY].
182. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 408 (1973).
183. Cf. R. P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights? Toward a
Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 32
(1993) [hereinafter Peerenboom 1993] ("Confucianism continues even today to
be the basis of the Chinese world view, despite the attempts of the socialist
government [in the early 1990s] to eradicate such 'feudal' thinking.").
184. Cf. supra note 181 and infra notes 187-201 and accompanying text
(noting the early start and describing the development and peak of Mao's
decades-long, anti-Confucian crusade).
185. See SNOW, supra note 144, at 131, 133-34, 135 (quoting Mao Zedong).

35

2013]

CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

1191

grain from poor peasants and transporting it to the city for sale to
merchants at a profit–disapproved of his son’s reading habits,
arguing that by mastering the classics the younger Mao could
have helped his father to win lawsuits.186 By the time Mao
Zedong had risen to lead the Communist Party of China (CPC) in
its uneasy alliance with the Guomindang during the AntiJapanese War (1937-45), Mao was denouncing “the worship of
Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, the old ethical code
and the old ideologies” as symptoms of a “semi-feudal culture”
that together had “formed a reactionary cultural alliance [with
imperialist culture that] . . . serves the imperialists and the
feudal class and must be swept away.”187
Mao’s anti-Confucian crusade reached its peak during the
Cultural Revolution (1966-76).188 Confucius and Mencius were
pilloried in pamphlets and the press,189 which linked the Master
and his most illustrious disciple with the “bourgeois careerist,
conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor” Lin Biao (Lin
Piao),190 whom Mao had purged in the early 1970s as a threat to
his own power.191 Some of these polemics focused on the
opposition of Confucius and his followers to the Legalists,192
albeit as proxies for opponents and supporters of Mao’s radical

186. Id. at 131, 133-34 (quoting Mao Zedong).
187. MAO TSE-TUNG ON NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 181, at 1 n.1, 59-60.
188. See generally THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY 224 (Joseph
W. Esherick et al. eds., 2006).
189. See, e.g., 1 YANG JUNG-KUO ET AL., SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN
PIAO AND CONFUCIUS (1974) [hereinafter ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1]; 2
YANG JUNG-KUO ET AL., SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS
(1975) [hereinafter ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 2].
190. ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1, supra note 189, at Publisher's Note;
ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 2, supra note 189, at Publisher's Note.
Ironically, Lin Biao had compiled Mao's "Little Red Book" of quotations. E.g.,
KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 268.
191. See, e.g., CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 165, at 552-64.
192. See Lo Szu-ting, Evolution of the Debate Between the Confucians and
Legalists as Seen from Wang An-shih's Reform – On Reading A Brief Study of
the Biography of Wang Ching Kung, in ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1, supra
note 189, at 185; Lo Szu-ting, Struggle Between Restoration and CounterRestoration in the Course of Founding the Chin Dynasty – In Relation to the
Social Basis of the Polemics Between the Confucianist and Legalist Schools, in
ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1, supra note 189, at 107.
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political program, respectively.193 Amid the relentless antiConfucian propaganda of the era,194 even school children were
required to write poems “exposing” Confucius and Lin Biao.195
Yet the appeal of Confucianism as a cultural touchstone for
the masses was fated to survive this onslaught largely intact, as
even Mao seemed to realize near the end of his life.196 One
incident stands out as especially prophetic. In August 1966, a
band of Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards, inspired by Mao’s call
to destroy the Four Olds (si jiu)–Old Thought, Old Culture, Old
Customs, and Old Habits197–massed outside the Confucian
Temple complex in Qufu (Ch’ü-fu), the hometown of both
Confucius and Mencius, intending to smash it to bits.198 Local
peasants, students, militia members, and government officials
joined forces to fight off the young zealots, leaving them battered
and humiliated but no less eager to achieve their goal.199 After a
three-month siege of the complex, with their ranks swelled by
hundreds of reinforcements from Beijing, the red guards attacked
again, forcing the defenders to surrender, and sacking the

193. See Shao-chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China
as Reflecting Mao Tse-tung's Influence, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356, 36973 (1977).
194. See GEORGE H. W. BUSH, CHINA DIARY OF GEORGE H. W. BUSH 30-31
(Jeffrey A. Engel ed., 2008). Cf. JAMES LILLEY WITH JEFFREY LILLEY, CHINA
HANDS 176 (2004) (noting that the "popular slogan" at the time of the official
opening of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing in 1973 was "Criticize Lin, Criticize
Confucius").
195. BUSH, supra note 194, at 336.
196. See Dahpon David Ho, To Protect and Preserve: Resisting the Destroy the
Four Olds Campaign, 1966-1967, in THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS
HISTORY 64, 92 (Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz & Andrew G. Walder
eds., 2006). Cf. KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 110 (noting that when during their
historic summit meeting in 1972 President Richard Nixon complimented Mao on
the success of his efforts to transform China's ancient civilization, Mao replied,
"I haven't been able to change it. I've only been able to change a few places in
the vicinity of Beijing."). But cf. Ho, supra, at 85-89 (quoting the county official
who led local residents in an effort to protect the most important Confucian
historical sites from destruction by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution
as recalling, "The Three Confucian Sites were treasures of China–we weren't
defending Confucius, we were defending our country's cultural relics.").
197. Ho, supra note 196, at 65-66.
198. Id. at 86.
199. Id. at 64, 84, 85-86, 86-87.
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Confucius family tombs.200 The local residents and officials
succeeded in protecting other parts of the complex from
destruction, however, with the help of at least two highly placed
CPC officials in Beijing.201
Mao’s death in 1976 finally brought the Cultural Revolution
to an end.202 By 1980, Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsao-p’ing) (190497), who had sought to moderate the effects of Mao’s culture war
after Mao summoned him back from internal exile in 1973,203 had
consolidated his power as China’s new supreme leader.204 Under
Deng’s leadership, the PRC soon adopted a new constitution.205
This Constitution affirms that the Chinese State seeks to build a
“socialist
spiritual
civilization”
(shehuizhuyi
jingshen
206
a goal officially endorsed by Deng at the Twelfth
wenming),
National Party Congress three months before the adoption of the
Constitution itself.207 The Constitution sheds little light on the
meaning of this term,208 except perhaps indirectly in its
preamble, which declares that the Chinese people “will continue
to . . . follow the socialist road” under “the guidance of Marxism-

200. Id. at 64, 84-85, 86, 88, 89-90, 90-91, 92.
201. See id. at 90, 91-92. Cf. id. at 88-89 (describing the local defenders' efforts
during the siege to forestall the destruction of the sites).
202. Cf. Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz & Andrew G. Walder, The
Chinese Cultural Revolution as History: An Introduction, in THE CHINESE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY 1, 1 (Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz
& Andrew G. Walder eds., 2006) (noting that the military repression and
campaigns of political persecution associated with the Cultural Revolution
began to fade in the early 1970s, but that China remained politically unstable
until Mao's death, with effects that stretched into the early 1980s).
203. CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 165, at 612-14.
204. See KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 329-39.
205. PRC CONST., supra note 5.
206. Id. art. 24 (1982).
207. See 12th National Party Congress Opens, BEIJING REV., Sept. 6, 1982,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/90th/2011-07/01/content_373426.htm#. Cf. DENG
XIAOPING, Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC (Sept.
1, 1982), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982) 394, 396 (Bureau
for the Compilation & Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin & Stalin
under the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China, 1984) (translating the
phrase as "socialist civilization"). See generally RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO:
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG XIAOPING 143-44 (1996) (recounting the
origin of the term).
208. See PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 24 (1982) (“The state strengthens the
building of socialist spiritual civilization . . . .").
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Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the
important thought of ‘Three Represents.’”209 Thirty years later,
however, it has become clear that the PRC’s “socialist spiritual
civilization” is imbued with precious little socialism, which for the
bulk of the Chinese population has little normative appeal,210 but
also is suffused with a heavy dose of Confucianism.211 Since
2004, the Central Government has underscored the salience of
Confucian values in contemporary China by helping to establish
more than three hundred Confucius Institutes at colleges and
universities in more than ninety countries and regions around the
world, with more than sixty in the United States alone.212 These
institutes promote the Chinese language and traditional Chinese
culture, including key Confucian values such as benevolence,
righteousness, and harmony,213 if not Confucianism per se.214 Hu
209. Compare id. art. 24 (1982), with id. at pmbl., para. 3 (1982), and id.
amend. IV, ¶ 1 (2004) (amending the preamble in relevant part). Until 1999,
when the reference to Deng Xiaoping Theory was added, the Constitution cited
only Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Compare id. amend. III,
paras. 1-2 (1999) (amending "paragraph seven" [sic] of the preamble), with id.
amend. II, ¶ 3 (1993) (amending the preamble), and id. pmbl., para. 3 (1982).
The reference to PRC President Jiang Zemin's (1993-2003) "Three Represents"
was added in 2004. See id. amend. IV, ¶ 1 (2004). See generally PEERENBOOM,
supra note 53, at 237 n.166 (explaining the meaning and limited impact of the
"Three Represents," also translated as the "Three Representatives"). Of these
four ideologies, Deng Xiaoping Theory has become the most important by far as
a practical matter. Cf. Maria Hsia Chang, The Thought of Deng Xiaoping, 29
COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 376, 377-78, 384-86 (1996) (arguing that
Deng Xiaoping Theory, which as "theory" has been elevated by the Chinese
Communist Party to a status equal to that of Marxism and Leninism, has
guided China's economic modernization and the revival of Chinese nationalism
by transforming Marxism into an ideology of developmental nationalism).
210. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 170-71, 407.
211. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 44-45; Peerenboom 1993, supra note 183, at
32; but see PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 171, 407 (asserting that the
Communist Party's efforts to create a "socialist spiritual civilization," which
includes "praise for the indigenous and illustrious tradition of Confucianism,"
and to "revitalize Confucianism," have been "largely ineffectual").
212. See, e.g., Liu Chang, No Need to Fuss over Confucius Institutes, CHINA
DAILY, Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-08/14/content_
11152936.htm; China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2011, at 52.
213. Liu Chang, supra note 212. Cf., e.g., CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. I, ¶
12, bk. IV, ¶ 16 (quoting a discipline of Confucius as identifying harmony as the
most valuable thing brought about by following the li, and quoting Confucius
himself as asserting that "[t]he gentleman is versed in what is moral," whereas
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Jintao (Hu Chin-t’ao), who as both General Secretary of the
CPC’s Central Committee (2002-12) and PRC President (2003-13)
embraced the ancient Confucian concept of a xiaokang
(hsiaok’ang)–or moderately well-off–lifestyle to define his nearterm vision for Chinese society, has been a prime mover behind
these and other official efforts to revive Confucianism in the PRC,
as have his Premier Wen Jiabao (Wen Chia-pao) (2003-13) and
the CPC generally.215 The irony of these developments in a
country that still purports to be guided by Mao Zedong Thought is
almost palpable.216 As if to highlight this irony, the authorities
erected a huge bronze statue of Confucius in Tiananmen (T’ien-an
Men) Square in January 2011, within a stone’s throw of Mao’s
mausoleum.217
Notwithstanding these developments, the PRC is not the
Empire, in which the State threw its full weight behind imperial
Confucianism as the ideological focal point of civic life.218 As if to
"[t]he small man is versed in what is profitable," respectively); MENCIUS, supra
note 81, at bk. I, pt. A, ¶ 1 (quoting Mencius as arguing that benevolence and
rightness are all that matter, and are more important than profit).
214. See China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, supra note 212,
at 52.
215. See Confucius and the Party Line, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 38;
Confucius Makes a Comeback, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2007, at 48. Cf. HU JINTAO,
HOLD HIGH THE GREAT BANNER OF SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS AND
STRIVE FOR NEW VICTORIES IN BUILDING A MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY IN
ALL RESPECTS: REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON OCT. 15, 2007 § IV (2007), available at
www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm (acknowledging the steady
progress that had been made toward achieving “the goal of building a
moderately prosperous society in all respects" set at the previous National Party
Congress in 2002, and setting forth "new requirements" for attaining that goal).
See generally KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 490-91, 563 n.3 (summarizing the
Confucian revival under Hu and Wen). President Jiang Zemin's (Chiang Tsemin's) (1993-2003) earlier efforts to promote the rule of virtue (dezhi) in the PRC
also had Confucian overtones. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 237 n.166.
216. Cf. PRC CONST., supra note 5, amend. IV, § 1 (2004) (revising paragraph 2
of the preamble to read in relevant part, "Under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of ‘Three
Represents’, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the
people's democratic dictatorship, [and] follow the socialist road . . . .").
217. See China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, supra note 212.
218. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 170, 407 (arguing in 2002 that
"traditional normative systems such as Confucianism . . . have withered" in
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underscore the difference, the authorities removed the statue of
Confucius from Tiananmen Square four months after its
installation after more than sixty percent of respondents to an
online poll conducted by the People’s Daily–the CPC newspaper–
opposed its presence there.219 Yet Confucianism clearly remains
a powerful force in Chinese society, even at the highest levels, as
its promotion by those at the pinnacles of both CPC and state
power attests.220
The Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition seems to
have been just as durable.221 The PRC’s legal system continues
to exhibit many of the Confucian hallmarks of its imperial and
Republican predecessors.222
For example, China’s legal
institutions remain relatively primitive by Western standards.223
Although there is much more law per se in China today than
there was during the Empire, and especially since the death of

China after being "[u]nder attack for the last fifty years," and that "the Party's
efforts over the years to destroy traditional normative systems such as
Confucianism . . . have taken their toll" such that its efforts to "revitalize
Confucianism" as a means of arresting China's moral decay "have been largely
ineffectual"); Peerenboom 1993, supra note 183, at 32 (acknowledging that
"Confucianism is not the only intellectual influence" on "the Chinese world
view").
219. See Andrew Jacobs, Confucius Statute Vanishes Near Tiananmen Square,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/
23confucius.html (reporting on the removal of the statue four months later);
China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, supra note 212.
220. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
221. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 45; Keller, supra note 20, at 712, 714-15; Yu
Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 32. Cf. CHOW, supra note 94, at 62 ("China's
current legal system represents in many ways a break with Confucianism . . . .
However, while it is one matter to formally break with traditions, it is another
matter to completely overcome the influence of traditions so deeply embedded in
centuries of Chinese culture."); REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 31
("Communism represents only the latest of a series of assaults on old concepts
and social institutions [in China]. Some aspects of traditional society may
survive better than others – for example, the . . . emphasis on ethics rather than
law.").
222. But cf. Keller, supra note 20, at 714 (asserting that "[t]here is little overt
evidence of a direct link between China's imperial legal order and the one more
recently established under the People's Republic of China," except for a few
conceptual and organizational terms embedded in PRC legislation).
223. See generally PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 12-17, 239-449 (surveying
the PRC's legislative system, judiciary, legal profession, and administrative law
regime).
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Mao, most of the impetus for law-making has come from the
Central Government’s desire to modernize China’s economy, to
attract foreign investment, and to be accepted for membership in
the World Trade Organization.224 Scholars estimate that at least
seventy percent of all laws proposed in the NPC, the Standing
Committee of the NPC, and the State Council during the first
wave of post-Mao legal reforms in the 1980s were economic
laws.225 In fact, China’s Legislation Law, which was enacted in
2000 and governs the enactment, revision, and nullification of all
other statutes, regulations, and rules in the PRC, declares that
“[l]aws shall be made in compliance with the . . . principle[ ] of
taking economic development as the central task . . . .”226
Significantly, the structural incoherence of this increasingly
voluminous body of law rivals that of the imperial fa, with CPC
and State policy–and perhaps traditional Chinese values–giving
its content the consistency that imperial Confucianism once gave
to the law of the Empire.227

224. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 59-61. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 49
("The disastrous Cultural Revolution [of the Mao era] made it clear to all that
China needed to rebuild its legal system to limit government arbitrariness and
provide the predictability and certainty required to attract foreign investors and
grow the economy."); Keller, supra note 20, at 713 (partly attributing the CPC's
pursuit of legal modernization beginning in 1978 to the recognition by Chinese
leaders that trade and investment legislation would be needed to attract foreign
investors to the PRC).
225. CHOW, supra note 94, at 326-27. For a summary of the major PRC laws of
relevance to commercial activity, see id. at 327-58. For the relationship between
the NPC and its Standing Committee, see supra note 19. The State Council
functions as both the executive body of the NPC and the highest organ of state
administration. PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 85 (1982). Cf. id. art. 57
(identifying the NPC as the "highest organ of state power"). It may exercise any
function or power that the NPC or its Standing Committee authorizes it to
exercise, but also may "adopt administrative measures, enact administrative
rules and regulations, and issue decisions and orders" on its own authority. Id.
art. 89, §§ 1, 18 (1982).
226. Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the Nat'l
People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, promulgated by Order No. 31 of the President
P.R.C., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 3, translated in ASIAN LEGAL
INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.
asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ll145/ (P.R.C.).
227. See Keller, supra note 20, at 717, 729. Cf. id. at 732-38 (describing the
complexity of the PRC's legislative hierarchy and its negative implications for
the coherence of Chinese law).
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Law in the PRC also remains unusually punitive by Western
standards. For example, PRC law permits the death penalty to
be imposed for dozens of offenses, almost two-thirds of them
nonviolent.228 Capital punishment remains popular with the
public, and even opponents acknowledge that its ongoing
popularity among many Chinese citizens is a function of deeplyrooted cultural beliefs about retributive justice and the death
penalty’s deterrent value.229 The PRC’s environmental statutes
include special provisions that prescribe administrative
punishments for state bureaucrats for abuse of authority or
dereliction of duty in carrying out their environmental
supervisory or administrative responsibilities, even if their
unlawful behavior is neither criminal nor fraudulent, nor for
personal gain.230 The remedy for these purely administrative
transgressions is not merely the setting aside of an action
unlawfully taken or the compulsion of an action unreasonably
delayed or unlawfully withheld, as one would expect in the
West.231 A separate statute–the Administrative Punishments
Law,232 which the National People’s Congress adopted in part to
ensure effective state administration233–provides in relevant part
for the administrative punishment of governmental officials for a
228. Reducing Death Penalty Crimes in China More Symbol than Substance,
DIALOGUE, Fall 2010, at 1, available at http://duihua.org/work/publications/nl
/nl_pdf/nl_41.pdf. In 2010, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress started to consider a proposed amendment to the law that would
remove from the list thirteen economic crimes for which the death penalty has
been imposed rarely, if ever. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id. at 1, 3.
230. See PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 67; PRC Envtl. Effects
Evaluation Law, supra note 27, arts. 28, 30, 32, 35; PRC Atmospheric Pollution
Law, supra note 28, art. 65; PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art.
94; PRC Noise Pollution Law, supra note 31, art. 62; PRC Envtl. Prot. Law,
supra note 21, art. 45. One other environmental statute includes a similar
provision that refers merely to punishments prescribed by law. See PRC Water
Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 69.
231. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (defining the
scope of judicial review of the actions of administrative agencies).
232. Administrative Punishments Law (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 17, 1996, promulgated by Order No. 63 of the President P.R.C., Mar. 17,
1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/
laws/apl330/ (P.R.C.).
233. See id. art. 1.
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broad array of purely administrative transgressions, including
the failure to check or to punish the unlawful acts of others.234
As these punitive provisions suggest, PRC law also remains
disproportionately aimed at policing the behavior of state
bureaucrats, at least by Western standards. Many laws are
internal or otherwise not accessible to the general public for that
reason.235 At least one Western scholar of Chinese law has
discerned in this lack of transparency a cultural legacy of the
imperial Confucianism in which the Emperor’s bureaucrats were
steeped, which was based in part on the Mencian belief that
human beings are naturally good, and which therefore meant
that those bureaucrats could be trusted to behave appropriately
without public supervision.236 The provisions of the PRC’s laws
that are concerned with punishing government officials are aimed
primarily at subordinate officials, however. The PRC’s senior
leaders, and the CPC generally, remain wholly or partly above
the law,237 as was Mao,238 the President of the Chinese Republic
and the Guomindang, and the Emperors and mandarins of old.239
Most importantly, the current attitudes of the Chinese people
toward law differ hardly at all from the attitudes of their imperial
and Republican ancestors. For the bulk of the PRC’s population,
law in the Western sense remains almost as alien an institution
as ever, neither highly regarded nor often sought out as a means
234. See generally id. arts. 55-58, 61-62. Cf. id. arts. 59-60 (providing for the
administrative punishment of administrative officials for certain tort-like acts).
235. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 237 (quoting an e-mail message from
R. Randal Edwards to J. W. Head, Apr. 10, 2003).
236. See id. at 237, 237 n.35 (quoting an e-mail message from R. Randal
Edwards to J. W. Head, Apr. 10, 2003).
237. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 132, 214-15, 217, 419. This weakness
endures despite a 1999 constitutional amendment asserting that the PRC is
ruled in accordance with law. Cf. PRC CONST., supra note 5, amend. III, para. 3
(1999) (adding as a new "first section" of article 5, entitled "The People's
Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and
building a socialist country of law.").
238. Cf. REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 298 (describing Mao as the
"indispensable foc[us] of final power, somewhat like emperors of old."). In fact,
Mao's style of governance amounted to "a version of Confucian tradition through
the looking glass" in that it claimed to represent a radical departure from the
past, but relied on many traditional Chinese institutions. KISSINGER, supra note
165, at 94-95.
239. See supra notes 134, 149-66 and accompanying text.
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of resolving disputes or solving social problems.240 An extreme if
peculiarly cyber-age manifestation of the extent to which the
Chinese rely on non-legal mechanisms to enforce social norms is
the recent rise of the “human-flesh search engine” (renrou sousuo
yinqing), in which groups of ordinary Chinese citizens punish
perceived social deviants by identifying and shaming them online,
with the intention of mobilizing others to isolate them socially
and otherwise to punish them offline.241 Even to the extent that
Chinese citizens do turn to the law, they seem as eager as their
imperial forebears to temper its application with extralegal
factors such as the relationship and circumstances of the parties
and prevailing notions of justice.242 The contrast with the West
in that regard is stark.243 To the extent that law has come to
play a more important role in maintaining social and political
order in China since 1978 than it did historically, that
achievement is a function of the partial Westernization of
Chinese legal institutions in the face of a much older and more
robust Chinese legal tradition.244
The PRC insists that its legal system is socialist, despite its
many Confucian attributes.245 Whatever the merits of this
240. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 20, at 712; Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at
50.
241. See Tom Downey, China's Cyberposse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html.
242. See Keller, supra note 20, at 714-15.
243. Cf. RACHEL KLEINFELD BELTON, COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF THE RULE OF
LAW 9-10 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series No. 55,
2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=16405 (exploring the role of equality before the law in the
Western rule of law concept).
244. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 64-66. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at
161 ("By and large, . . . PRC scholars agree that China's traditional 'rule of man'
culture not only has precious few features that support rule of law but that it
constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to the realization of rule of law."); but cf.
Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping's China, 11
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 469, 472 (1997) (arguing that "foreign legal concepts and
traditions have been adapted within a broader framework of Marxian rule and
have been accommodated to the basic principles of socialism" in the PRC).
245. See, e.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 5 (1982) ("The state upholds the
uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system."). Cf. id. amend. III, paras.
2-3 (1999); id. at amend. IV, ¶ 1 (2004) (revising "paragraph seven" [sic] of the
preamble to read in relevant part, "The basic task of the nation is to concentrate
its efforts on socialist modernization by following along the road of Chinese-style
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official claim, it would be a misnomer to characterize socialist
legal theory in China as synonymous with the Chinese legal
tradition in the way that one might have characterized socialist
legal theory in the Soviet Union, for example, as synonymous
with the Soviet legal tradition.246 Socialist legal theory never had
the chance to put down the cultural roots in the PRC that it did in
the Soviet Union because of the fundamentally different roles
that law played in the founding and subsequent evolution of the
Soviet and PRC States.247 The responsibility for its failure to put
down cultural roots in China lies primarily with Mao. Although
Mao studied in the home of an unemployed law student for six
months while in his mid-teens, and a few years later registered
for but never attended a law school,248 he lacked Lenin’s formal
legal training and experience as a practicing lawyer.249 Law
played a central role in Lenin’s critiques of the tsarist regime and

socialism. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the
guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory
and the important thought of 'Three Represents,' the Chinese people of all
nationalities will continue to . . . improve the socialist legal system . . . ," and
adding as a new "first section" to article 5 "The People's Republic of China
practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a socialist
country of law.").
246. But cf. Lo, supra note 244, at 472 (asserting in the late 1990s that the
"tradition of 'socialist law'" remained important in the PRC).
247. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting the relationship
between a society's legal tradition and its legal culture).
248. SNOW, supra note 144, at 134-35, 143 (quoting Mao Zedong).
249. None of Mao's contemporaries in the senior Party leadership were
lawyers either. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 44. Lenin, however, studied
jurisprudence at the Imperial Kazan University until his participation in a
demonstration against state control of the university and the strict regulation of
student life led to his expulsion part way through his first year. ROBERT
SERVICE, LENIN: A BIOGRAPHY 63, 67-69 (2000).
He later passed the
jurisprudence exams as an external student at the Imperial St. Petersburg
University, where he was the only student in his class to earn the highest
possible grade in every subject. Id. at 82-84, 85-86. After graduation, he
practiced law as an assistant barrister for a year and a half in Samara before
moving back to St. Petersburg to take up the cause of revolution full time. Id. at
86, 89; see also id. at 91-93 (recounting Lenin's registration as an assistant to a
barrister after moving back to St. Petersburg, but noting that "[h]is legal work
went no further than occasional informal advice to friends and associates."). His
arguments before the court in Samara were reputed to be first-rate. See Jane
Burbank, Lenin and the Law in Revolutionary Russia, 54 SLAVIC REV. 23, 25
(1995).
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of the Provisional Government that briefly succeeded it,250 and
also loomed large in the Bolsheviks’ efforts to consolidate and
legitimize their rule after their seizure of power in October
1917.251 The Chinese Communists took a very different tack. In
the rural areas that they controlled before 1949, Mao and his
followers essentially replaced the pre-existing legal system with
an administrative one, in which the decrees of CPC leaders
established simple norms of political and social behavior.252
Although the CPC’s Central Committee purported to abolish all
Guomindang legislation even before the official founding of the
PRC, it also decreed that CPC policy would control in the absence
of new laws to replace the old.253 For the most part, these policy
directives served as a substitute for a formal legal system for the
PRC’s first few years.254 When the Chinese Communists finally
turned to building a formal legal system in the early 1950s, they
imported Soviet legal theory for the purpose.255 Yet even their
efforts to lay the foundation for a socialist Chinese legal culture
based on this foreign legal theory soon came to naught. By the
mid-1950s, Mao openly disdained even Stalin’s legal system as an
inherent constraint on class struggle.256 Mao preferred to
regulate social behavior through the internalization of social
norms inculcated through education and mass participation in a
politicized legal process and enforced by social pressures rather
than through the enforcement by bureaucratic institutions of
250. See Burbank, supra note 249, at 25-29, 30-34.
251. See id. at 36-42. Lenin himself drafted most of the first legal decrees to
be issued by the new Soviet government. See SERVICE, supra note 249, at 313-15,
316-18, 321.
252. See Keller, supra note 20, at 719.
253. Id.; see also Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 33 (reproducing in
translation an excerpt from the Party's February 1949 "Instructions" on the
abrogation and criticism of the Guomindang laws).
254. See Keller, supra note 20, at 719. The Chinese Communists acted with
Bolshevik-like dispatch in establishing a constitutional basis for their state,
however. Compare id. at 719-20 (summarizing the Chinese Communists'
efforts), with Burbank, supra note 249, at 37-39, 38-39 n.68 (describing the
context and consequences of the Bolsheviks' early efforts).
255. See Keller, supra note 20, at 720. Cf. Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at
36-37 (describing the PRC's "large-scale adoption . . . of Soviet legal institutions
and Soviet legal thought" in the 1950s with the help of Soviet legal advisers, but
noting that the adoption of the former was "qualified" from the outset).
256. Lo, supra note 244, at 473.
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codified legal rules.257
Beginning with the “anti-rightist
campaign” (fan youpai yundong) of 1957, which nipped the liberal
“hundred flowers movement” (baihua yundong) of the previous
year in the bud,258 Mao systematically gutted the PRC’s nascent
socialist legal system, dismantling the Ministry of Justice,
transferring much of the procuracy’s259 functions to the state
security organs, and persecuting judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars who argued for greater legal control over the CPC, many
of whom were banished to the countryside to “learn from the
peasants.”260 Politics eclipsed law as the staple of Chinese legal
education and in the content of those legal journals that
continued to publish anything at all.261 The NPC’s legislative
activities ground to a halt, and would not resume for another
twenty years.262 After a brief revival in the early 1960s, the
fortunes of the legal system sunk even lower during the official
257. See Leng, supra note 193, at 356-57.
258. In 1956, Mao tried to revive China's flagging socialist revolution by
calling on Chinese intellectuals to "let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred
schools of thought contend." E.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 44-45. When
they responded with a blistering critique of the Communist Party, including its
management of legal affairs, see, e.g., CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 165, at
418, Mao abruptly cracked down on dissent. E.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 53,
at 45. For a more elaborate account of the "hundred flowers movement" and
Mao's "anti-rightist" response, see MU FU-SHENG, THE WILTING OF THE HUNDRED
FLOWERS: THE CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA UNDER MAO 166-73 (1962).
259. Notwithstanding their shifting fortunes under Mao, procuratorates in the
PRC are similar to procurators' offices in civil law jurisdictions, which in turn
are roughly comparable to attorneys' general or district attorneys' offices in
common law jurisdictions. Compare, e.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, arts. 129-35
(1982) (describing the structure and functions of the procuracy), and Organic
Law of the People's Procuratorates of the People's Republic of China (adopted by
the Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No. 4 of the
Chairman Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1,
1980, as amended by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1983),
art. 8, translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/olotppotproc656/
(P.R.C.), and Yu-Nan Chang, The Chinese Communist State System Under the
Constitution of 1954, 18 J. POL. 520, 544-45 (1956) (explaining the functions of
procuratorates under the 1954 PRC Constitution and the Organic Law of the
People's Procuratorates in effect at the time), with MERRYMAN & PÉREZPERDOMO, supra note 57, at 104-05 (summarizing the functions and career paths
of public prosecutors in civil law jurisdictions).
260. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 44-45; Keller, supra note 20, at 723.
261. See id. at 45.
262. See Keller, supra note 20, at 723.
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lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution,263 when even the CPC
newspaper People’s Daily editorialized in favor of lawlessness.264
Throughout this turbulent period, the normative policy
documents issued by the State’s administrative authorities
functioned as a substitute for law per se.265 The intensity and
duration of Mao’s onslaught made it impossible for socialist legal
theory to put down the cultural roots in China that otherwise
might have transformed it into an emergent Chinese legal
tradition.266
The modern era of Chinese legal history began in 1978, when
at the behest of Deng Xiaoping the Third Plenum of the Eleventh
Central Committee of the CPC formally called for the
strengthening of the PRC’s “socialist legal system.”267 This effort,
spurred primarily by the Central Government’s interest in jumpstarting the PRC’s development by integrating its economy with
the global economy,268 has produced a partially Westernized legal
system.269 Proponents of this legal modernization effort at first
resurrected Soviet legal theory and even draft Chinese legislation
from the 1950s; however, since the early 1980s these proponents
have developed a more sophisticated conception of China’s own
legal history and the function of law in China today.270 Deng
Xiaoping Theory, which as “theory” has been elevated by the CPC
to a status equal to that of Marxism and Leninism, has eclipsed
both Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the pole
star of China’s modernization efforts, and has been the ideological

263. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 45; Leng, supra note 193, at 358-59.
264. See In Praise of Lawlessness, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 31, 1967, translated in
U.S. CONSULATE GEN. H.K., SURVEY OF CHINA MAINLAND PRESS 13 (Feb. 14,
1967).
265. Keller, supra note 20, at 724.
266. Cf. supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (defining "legal tradition,"
and explaining the relationship between a society's legal tradition, its legal
culture, and its legal system).
267. CHOW, supra note 94, at 56-57. Cf. Deng Xiaoping, Emancipate the Mind,
Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future (December 13,
1978), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982) 151, 157-58 (1984)
(arguing in a speech at the close of preparations for the Third Plenum that the
PRC must strengthen its legal system in order "[t]o ensure people's democracy").
268. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
269. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 64-66.
270. Keller, supra note 20, at 727.

49

2013]

CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

1205

driving force behind its legal revival.271 As a practical matter,
Deng Xiaoping Theory pays only lip service to socialism per se,
and then only for its instrumental value as a means of enabling
China to remain independent of foreign domination, especially
given the PRC’s current economic circumstances.272 Deng’s often
cited adaptation of the old Sichuan (Szechuan) saying about the
unimportance of a cat’s color as long as the cat catches mice
endures as one of the most revealing symbols of his pragmatism
in that regard.273 Given the PRC’s insistence that its legal
system is a socialist one, it might be tempting to characterize the
evolution of that legal system since 1978 as evidence of the
emergence of a distinctly Chinese socialist legal theory.274 The
purely instrumental link between Deng Xiaoping Theory and
socialism per se, however, strongly suggests that these
developments merely signify a resurgence of the pragmatic
instrumentalism that has been a hallmark of Chinese legal
culture since the unification of China under the Qin, but which
found its most persistent expression in the Confucian legal
tradition that began to emerge a hundred years later during the
reign of the Han emperor Wudi.275
271. Lo, supra note 244, at 474, 476; see also Chang, supra note 209, at 377-78,
384-86.
272. See Chang, supra note 209, at 385-86.
273. Cf., e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 217 (citing Deng's remark in
pointing out that it would be easy to overstate the importance of socialist
ideology per se in China today). See generally Qin Hanxiong, Deng Xiaoping's
Famous "Cat Theory" from Where?, XINHUA (Apr. 24, 2011), http://news
.xinhuanet.com/2011-04/24/c_121341795.htm (explaining the origin of Deng's
"cat theory").
274. Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 30 n.4, 36-37 (explaining the version of
Marxist legal theory used by Chinese legal scholars in their efforts to adapt
Marxism to Chinese conditions, and arguing in the late 1980s that the Soviet
model of legal theory continues to exert a strong influence in the PRC). Cf. Lo,
supra note 244, at 474-86 (explaining Deng Xiaoping's approach to law, and
arguing that it set the stage for the development of a Chinese socialist theory of
law).
275. See Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 40 n.44, 49. Cf. id. at 30, 37-50
(arguing that legal reforms in the PRC have paid lip service to Marxist legal
theory, but otherwise have been purely pragmatic, with legal instrumentalism
as a means of promoting economic development playing a prominent role); but
see Keller, supra note 20, at 754-55 (identifying an instrumentalism rooted in
Soviet socialist legal theory as an emphasis of the dominant theme in the
development of the formal sources of PRC law in the 1980s and 1990s). Yu
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Even to the extent that socialist legal theory per se provides
part of the ideational foundation for the PRC’s current legal
system, it merely reinforces one of the most central tenets of the
Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition. Socialist legal
theory flowered beginning in the late 1930s when Josef Stalin
(1879-1953) rejected the orthodox Marxist view that law was
merely a tool of capitalist exploitation made obsolete by the
destruction of the bourgeois State.276 The principal architect of
the new view was Stalin’s chief prosecutor, Andrei Ianuar’evich
Vyshinskii (1883-1954).277 Marx had conceptualized law as a
product of the dissolution of natural human communities and the
formation of the State for the purpose of protecting the property
and interests of the ruling class,278 first under feudalism and
then under capitalism. Accordingly, orthodox Soviet Marxists
expected both law and the State to wither away with the success
of the proletarian revolution and the abolition of private property

Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 37 (noting that the adoption by Chinese scholars
in the 1950s of a Soviet model of legal theory "illustrates the beginnings of the
Chinese-style pragmatic approach in law."). For the significance of the Qin
Dynasty and Emperor Wudi in the development of Chinese legal culture, see
supra notes 69-78, 83-88, 99-109 and accompanying text.
276. Compare J. V. Stalin, Report to the XVIII Party Congress, in SOVIET
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 343, 347-48 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1951) (arguing that Marxism permits the socialist State to perform certain
functions performed by the bourgeois State, albeit in the service of the
proletarian dictatorship), with E. B. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law
and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 111 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1951) (expounding on the view of law that Stalin rejected, from the
perspective of a leading proponent). See generally Lo, supra note 244, at 470-71
(summarizing the impact of Stalin's view on the development of socialist legal
theory).
277. See, e.g., W. E. Butler, Towards an Introduction to Russian Legal Theory,
in RUSSIAN LEGAL THEORY xi, xliii-xliv (Int'l Library of Essays in Law & Legal
Theory Series, Legal Cultures No. 11, Tom D. Campbell ser. ed., W. E. Butler
vol. ed., 1996). Cf. A. Y. Vyshinsky, The Fundamental Tasks of the Science of
Soviet Socialist Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 303 (Hugh W. Babb trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1951) (laying down the Stalinist line regarding the nature
and functions of law in Soviet society).
278. See Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I (S. Rayazanskaya trans. &
ed.), in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 146, 186-87 (Robert C. Tucker ed., W. W.
Norton 2d ed. 1978) (1964).

51

2013]

CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

1207

under socialism.279 Vyshinskii argued, however, following Stalin,
that both the law and the state would wither away only after they
had achieved their maximum strength, which they would do
under socialism, when socialism finally gave way to
communism.280 He went on to define law in purely instrumental
terms. According to Vyshinskii,
[l]aw is the aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will
of the dominant class and established in legal order, as well as of
customs and rules of community life confirmed by state
authority, the application whereof is guaranteed by the coercive
force of the state to the end of safeguarding, making secure and
developing social relationships and arrangements advantageous
and agreeable to the dominant class.281

Accordingly, law’s essential purpose under socialism is
merely to strengthen the socialist State.282 It was not until the
1970s that Soviet legal scholars began to depart publicly from the
conflation of law in general (jus) with the positive law (lex) on
which Vyshinskii’s instrumental conception of law rests.283
In their efforts to build a socialist legal system, Chinese legal
theorists wholeheartedly embraced Vyshinskii’s conception of law
as the instrument through which the State pursues the interests
of the ruling class.284 In their view, the function of the law is
merely to express the norms of current CPC policy.285 To the

279. See, e.g., Pashukanis, supra note 276, at 121-24. Cf. id. at 119-20 ("Only
bourgeois-capitalist society creates all the conditions essential to the attainment
of complete definiteness by the juridic element in social relationships.").
280. See Vyshinsky, supra note 277, at 336. Cf. id. at 328 (arguing that that
law reaches its highest stage of development under socialism). For Vyshinskii,
proponents of the orthodox Marxist view were "provocateur[s]," "wrecker[s],"
"Trotsky-Bukharin fascist agents," and "traitors." Id. at 303-04, 307, 313-16.
281. Id. at 336 (footnote omitted). For alternative versions of Vyshinskii's
definition, both as delivered orally and as subsequently published, see Butler,
supra note 277, at xliii.
282. Cf. id. at 331-32 (arguing that "the tasks of the science of soviet socialist
law . . . require . . . the development and strengthening of soviet law and the
soviet state to the maximum degree."). Vyshinskii insisted, however, that law
was not merely synonymous with state policy. See id. at 328, 330.
283. Butler, supra note 277, at xliv.
284. Keller, supra note 20, at 720; Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 36-37.
285. Keller, supra note 20, at 721.
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extent that there is any truth in the PRC’s insistence that its
legal system is, or ever has been, a meaningfully socialist one,
despite the ravages that it suffered under Mao and its partial
Westernization since 1978, the purportedly socialist theoretical
foundation of that system merely reinforces one of the most
central tenets of the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal
tradition, according to which law is merely a source of political
power with no inherent moral significance.286 The idea that the
positive law (lex), if not law in general (jus), is inherently
instrumentalist, is such a core component of socialist legal theory
that the same reinforcing relationship would hold true whether
the socialist legal theory underpinning the PRC’s current legal
system were the Stalinist version imported by the Chinese
Communists in the 1950s but ultimately orphaned by Mao, or
some post-1978, specifically Chinese variant developed to support
the PRC’s more recent economic modernization efforts.
Against this cultural and theoretical backdrop, the relative
ineffectiveness of Western-style environmental laws in the PRC–
from both compliance and enforcement perspectives–should come
as no surprise. For more than 2,000 years, the Confucian essence
of the Chinese legal tradition has marginalized law as a means of
maintaining social and political order, and thus as a means of
implementing public policies, which is one of its principal
functions in the West.287 Socialist legal theory–to the extent that
it plays any meaningful role as part of the ideational foundation
of the PRC’s current legal system–reinforces this Confucian
cultural phenomenon by positing law as a mere instrument of
political power, rather than as an inherently moral force.
The results of recent social science survey research on the
perceived effectiveness of environmental law enforcement in the
PRC implicitly underscore this point. In 2000, researchers
concerned about an environmental law “enforcement gap” in the

286. Cf. supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining fa's lack of moral
validity in the Confucian legal tradition).
287. Cf. BELTON, supra note 243, at 9 ("A government bound by law [in
accordance with the Western rule of law concept] must act through pre-written
laws in executing its decisions and change laws through established legislative
means. . . . Binding the government to rule by law is the sine qua non of the rule
of law.").
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PRC surveyed local environmental enforcement officials in three
cities, deemed to be broadly representative of urban China, in
order to assess the relative influence of certain factors on the
officials’ perceptions of the effectiveness of environmental law
enforcement in their jurisdictions, and to identify any
geographical variation in these patterns of influence.288 The
researchers used the perceptions of these officials as reasonably
reliable proxies for the effectiveness of environmental law
enforcement per se,289 which they conceptualized in terms that
seemed to presume noncompliance in the absence of
enforcement.290 Of the five factors analyzed, the officials’ beliefs
in the legitimacy of the policies expressed through environmental
laws was the only one that had a significant positive relationship
to the officials’ perceptions of the effectiveness of environmental
law enforcement in all three cities, with relatively little variation
across jurisdictions.291 This result led the researchers to conclude
that environmental officials in the PRC should be hired and
288. See Carlos Wing-hung Lo, Gerald E. Fryxell & Wilson Wai-ho Wong,
Effective Regulations with Little Effect? The Antecedents of the Perceptions of
Environmental Officials on Enforcement Effectiveness in China, 38 ENVTL.
MGMT. 388, 389-90, 394 (2006) [hereinafter Lo et al.]. The officials questioned
were officials of the local EPBs. Id. at 394. For a summary of the role of local
EPBs in the PRC's environmental law and policy regime, see supra notes 53-54
and accompanying text.
289. See Lo et al., supra note 288, at 390, 395.
290. Cf. id. at 390, 391 (defining "enforcement effectiveness" in terms of
"closing the enforcement gap" by "securing compliance," and defining
"enforcement gap" as a gap in compliance, not in enforcement). This apparent
presumption is significant in the Chinese context given the Confucian
conception of law as inherently lacking in moral force. Cf. supra note 100 and
accompanying text (explaining fa's lack of moral validity in the Confucian legal
tradition).
291. See Lo et al., supra note 288, at 399, 402-03. The researchers had
hypothesized that the relationship between these variables would be positive,
and that there would be a positive relationship between the enforcement
officials' perceptions of the effectiveness of environmental law enforcement in
their jurisdictions and the officials' environmental values, perceptions of
sufficient organizational capacity, perceptions of support from other societal
organizations, and perceptions of support from local and regional governmental
departments, and that the relationships between these factors and the officials'
perceptions of the legitimacy of the policies expressed through environmental
laws, on the one hand, and the officials' perceptions of the effectiveness of
environmental law enforcement in their jurisdictions, on the other hand, would
vary by location. See id. at 391-94.
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trained so as to ensure that they believe in the legitimacy of their
work.292 It also implies, however, that the extent to which
enforcement officials consider the policies expressed through the
PRC’s environmental laws to be legitimate is more important
than the fact that those policies are expressed through law per se
in determining the extent to which they are likely to be enforced.
This effect is precisely what one would expect in a society steeped
for millennia in an essentially Confucian legal tradition, in which
law per se has no inherent moral significance.293
IV. TOWARD A CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY REGIME WITH MORE CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
The Chinese people have every reason to be proud of their
ancient civilization.294 Even Mao Zedong, whose goal in founding
the PRC was not merely to create a free and prosperous China,
but “to change a China which has been ignorant and backward
under the rule of the old culture into a China that will be
enlightened and progressive under the rule of a new culture,”
acknowledged China’s ancient cultural splendor, and argued that
the success of his transformational project depended on the
absorption into the new culture of certain features of the old.295
Yet for more than a century, in a radical departure from
millennia of past practice,296 China has looked to the West for
292. See id. at 402-04.
293. Cf. supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining fa's lack of moral
validity in the Confucian legal tradition).
294. Cf. PRC CONST., supra note 5, pmbl., para. 1 (1982) ("China is one of the
countries with the longest histories in the world. The people of all nationalities
in China have jointly created a splendid culture . . . .").
295. MAO TSE-TUNG ON NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 181, at 3, 81-82.
296. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. VII, ¶ 1 (quoting Confucius as
saying, "I transmit but do not innovate; I am . . . devoted to antiquity."); Chiang
Kai-shek, Conclusion to SUN YAT-SEN, SAN MIN CHU I: THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF
THE PEOPLE WITH TWO SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 318, 32429 (Frank W. Price trans., Comm'n for the Compilation of the History of the
Kuomintang ed., n.d.) (describing in detail how the goal of Sun Yat-sen's plans
for a Min Sheng ("People's Livelihood") type of social reconstruction resembles
the ancient Confucian vision of a "Great Commonwealth"); SUN YAT-SEN, supra
note 118, at 37-41, 151, 184 (arguing that the Chinese people must recover their
ancient morality if they are to restore their international standing, and equating
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models of its own future, with mixed results.297 In recent
decades, the Chinese have made no secret of their eagerness to
borrow from Western environmental laws.298
The result
illustrates the pitfalls of a derivative approach.299
One strategy for improving the effectiveness of the PRC’s
environmental law and policy regime would be to transform the
PRC’s legal culture along Western lines so as to make it more
supportive of the PRC’s nominally Chinese but heavily law-based,
essentially Western approach to mitigating the negative
environmental impacts of China’s rapid industrialization. The
barriers to the success of this strategy would be formidable,
however. As cultural phenomena, legal traditions are enduring
by definition.300 Cultures “resist manipulation,” as one social
scientist has observed, because “people defend their
assumptions,”301 and pass them on to the next generation of their
social group as constitutive elements of the group’s identity.302
Transforming the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal
tradition, which continues to roll through the millennia like a
juggernaut despite more than a century of fitful efforts to

the goal of his Min Sheng ("People's Livelihood") Principle with Confucius's hope
of a "great commonwealth.").
297. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 315-20; KENT,
supra note 113, at 26-29, 34, 64-65, 168-69, 360, 374-75; PEERENBOOM, supra
note 53, at 43; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 42, 231; SHARMAN, supra note 152, at
218-19; SUN YAT-SEN, supra note 118, at 46, 108-09, 136; Keller, supra note 20,
at 712.
298. See Standaert 07/20/11, supra note 22. Cf. Standaert 01/18/12, supra note
47 (describing the PRC's use of foreign models in its efforts to design pilot
carbon trading systems for several provinces and municipalities).
299. Cf. SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 343, 355-57 (arguing that China's efforts
to adapt to the outside world by imitating the West leaves "China's individual
genius . . . thwarted of its own expression," as illustrated by Sun Yat-sen's
disregard for the fundamentally family-based structure of Chinese society in his
plan for a Chinese republic.).
300. Cf. Gerring & Barresi, supra note 58, at 252 (identifying endurance as an
ideal-type attribute of the culture concept as revealed by the ordinary social
science usage of the term).
301. SAMUEL H. BARNES, POLITICS AND CULTURE 16 (1988).
302. Cf. Gerring & Barresi, supra note 58, at 249, 255 (identifying culture's
"learned" and constitutive qualities as ideal-type and minimal attributes of the
culture concept, respectively, as revealed by the ordinary social science usage of
the term).
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Westernize China’s legal institutions,303 would be especially
fraught with challenges. It would be the work of generations,
perhaps dozens of generations,304 if it could be done at all, as
Given the severity and
Mao’s ghost might attest.305
pervasiveness of the PRC’s environmental crisis,306 as well as the
PRC’s newfound status as the world’s largest emitter of carbon
dioxide,307 the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas,308
neither China nor the world has the time to wait.
A more viable strategy would seek to make the PRC’s
environmental law and policy regime more effective by aligning it
more closely with the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal
tradition.309 At least three strategic corrections to the current
trajectory of that regime would seem to be in order. First, the
PRC’s environmental law and policy regime probably would be
more effective if it relied on law as little as possible as a means of
expressing environmental policies, which probably means relying
on it much less than is the case now. Law is merely one way of
expressing public policies.310 Political practice is another.311 It

303. See Keller, supra note 20, at 714 (“There is little overt evidence of a direct
link between China's imperial legal order and the one more recently established
under the People's Republic of China," except for a few conceptual and
organizational terms embedded in PRC legislation, but arguing that "the
influence of China's once dominant Confucian ethos is readily apparent in the
variant strains of modern Chinese legal culture.").
304. Cf. SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 370-71 (arguing that the creation of an
ethic of democracy in China would be a multi-generational task).
305. Cf. supra notes 181, 187-201, 211-17 and accompanying text (describing
Mao's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to rid Chinese culture of Confucianism,
and its resurgence even at an official level in recent years).
306. Cf. supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (describing the PRC's
environmental crisis).
307. See Press Release, PBL Neth. Envtl. Assessment Agency, Chinese CO2
Emissions in Perspective (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.pbl.nl/en/
news/pressreleases/2007/20070622ChineseCO2emissionsinperspective.html.
308. Cf. WEART, supra note 16, at 2, 26-30, 114, 126-29 (comparing the current
and potential future contributions to global warming of anthropogenic carbon
dioxide and other anthropogenic greenhouse gases).
309. Cf. Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 34 (noting that as a legal adviser to
the Guomindang Ministry of Justice in the twilight of the Republic Roscoe
Pound argued that the Chinese should seek Chinese solutions to Chinese
problems instead of adopting Western legal principles).
310. See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 130-31 (1953).

57

2013]

CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

1213

has become clear that the PRC’s national five-year plans–as well
as the larger complex of related shorter- and longer-term national
and local planning and related policy documents of which those
five-year plans are a part–can be much more effective than law in
achieving ambitious environmental policy goals.312 Although the
national five-year plans are ratified by the NPC,313 they are
essentially political documents drafted by Central Government
bureaucrats under the supervision of the CPC to provide a “vision
and guideline” (guihua) for economic and social development
practice at all administrative levels of the State, and increasingly
include a host of environmental policy goals.314 Law undoubtedly
has an important role to play in the PRC’s future efforts to
mitigate the negative environmental impacts of its rapid
industrialization, but the Confucian attitudes toward the role of
law in society and the polity around which the Chinese legal
tradition has revolved for more than 2,000 years strongly suggest
that environmental law would be more effective in the PRC if

311. See id. at 131.
312. Cf. Michael Standaert, Energy: Chinese Provinces Restrict Electricity Use,
Raise Rates to Meet Energy Intensity Goals, 33 INT'L ENV'T REP. 941 (2010)
(describing the extraordinary efforts of many provinces to meet the energy
intensity goals in the PRC's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-10) in the final
months of the planning period). See generally JOSEPH CASEY & KATHERINE
KOLESKI, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC & SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION,
BACKGROUNDER: CHINA'S 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 2, 5-7 (2011), available at http://
origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf
(describing the powerful political incentives for local government officials to
achieve the goals of the national five-year plans, noting the use of additional
incentives for local officials to achieve the environmental and energy policy goals
in those plans, and noting elements of the complex of government planning and
related policy documents of which the plans are a part).
313. See PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 62(9) (1982).
314. See, e.g., CASEY & KOLESKI, supra note 312, at 1-3, 11, app. I, app. II at
16-17, apps. III-IV. Since the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-10), the Chinese
authorities have used the term guihua (kueihua) -- literally "plan" or "planning,"
but connoting "vision and guideline," "program," or "layout" -- instead of the
term jihua (chihua) -- merely "plan" or "planning" -- to refer to these documents,
which signifies a shift in focus from detailed central planning and quantitative
economic indicators to a more market-oriented approach, broad principles and
development goals, and a range of quality of life factors, including
environmental ones. See C. Cindy Fan, China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (20062010): From "Getting Rich First" to "Common Prosperity," 47 EURASIAN
GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 708, 717-18 (2006).
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there were much less of it than is the norm in the West, which
probably means much less of it than there is now.
Second, the PRC’s environmental law and policy regime
probably would be more effective if its laws focused more than
they do now on policing the behavior of state bureaucrats, and
less on regulating the activities of private parties and their quasiprivate analogs, such as state-owned enterprises. In their
heightened concern for punishing state bureaucrats for purely
administrative transgressions, the PRC’s environmental laws
already focus disproportionately on policing official behavior by
Western standards.315 Moreover, except for the provisions that
create or elaborate on private judicial or administrative causes of
action for injunctive relief or to recover compensatory damages
for environmental injuries,316 the PRC’s environmental statutes
at least superficially appear to follow the traditional Chinese
pattern in that the private or quasi-private activities with which
they are concerned are limited to those that impinge on state
interests–in this case, the State’s interests in achieving or
maintaining a desired level of environmental quality and in
preserving the social stability that presumably flows from doing
so.317 Just beneath the surface of these statutes, however, lies a
welter of Western-style policy design principles and
implementation strategies.318 The effect is to enmesh private
parties and their quasi-private analogs in an intricate, Westernstyle web of substantive and procedural requirements that in the
context of Western legal traditions–in which law is an inherently
moral force that plays a principal role in maintaining social and
315. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions
of the PRC's environmental statutes and Administrative Punishments Law
aimed at punishing state bureaucrats for purely administrative transgressions).
316. See, e.g., PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, arts. 85-86; PRC Solid
Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 84; PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note
28, art. 62; PRC Noise Pollution Law, supra note 31, art. 61. Cf. PRC Marine
Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 90, para. 1 (requiring anyone causing
pollution damage to the marine environment to remove the pollution and
provide compensation for the losses).
317. Cf. supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (describing the PRC's
environmental crisis, including its socially destabilizing effects).
318. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the
Western-style policy design principles and implementation strategies around
which the PRC's environmental laws revolve).
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political order319–would be merely one of the many legal costs of
doing business in a modern society, but in the context of the
Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition is a prescription
for noncompliance.320 The PRC’s environmental law and policy
regime probably would be more effective if its laws applied to
private parties and their quasi-private analogs only indirectly
through the agency of state bureaucrats to the maximum extent
possible given the laws’ policy goals, which probably means to a
much greater extent than is the case now. In accordance with
millennia of Chinese practice inspired by the Confucian essence
of the Chinese legal tradition, the PRC’s environmental laws
would look primarily to the bureaucracy as the human
instrumentality for achieving their goals.321
Third, the PRC’s environmental law and policy regime
probably would be more effective if its laws could be applied more
flexibly in ways designed to accommodate–or even to reinforce–
certain types of locally valued social relationships in which the
private and quasi-private enterprises to which those laws apply
are embedded. One of the hallmarks of Western environmental
laws is the nearly universal equality with which their
requirements are applied. Western environmental statutes and
regulations can be unequal in their formulation, especially where
structurally fragmented law- and policy-making systems–like
that of the United States–offer numerous points of access for
organized interests seeking to influence law and policy
outcomes.322 The result is often a host of statutory or regulatory

319. Cf. BELTON, supra note 243, at 5-6, 8-9, 10-11 (emphasizing that
"[p]rotection from one's fellow citizens – or law and order, as we would say today
– . . . is central to the popular understanding of the rule of law," an historically
Western cultural and institutional phenomenon, and explaining the history and
implications of the concept of a State bound by law as a rule of law goal);
REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 84 ("Western law has been conceived
of as a human embodiment of some higher order of God or nature . . . .").
320. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (emphasizing that law per
se almost never has played more than a subordinate role in maintaining social
and political order in China).
321. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (explaining the imperial
fa's preoccupation with policing the behavior of state bureaucrats).
322. See generally KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 289-357 (1986) (exploring the many ways
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exclusions or other special legal considerations for politically
skillful economic interests,323 and on rare occasions for individual
facilities.324
Moreover, in Western federations and
confederations, national environmental laws also may give
regional governments substantial discretion either in setting
environmental quality standards or in choosing the best means to
achieve them, which may include treating different subregions
differently, including on economic grounds, but typically within
legal limits set at the national level.325 Yet despite these
structurally conditioned anomalies, Western environmental laws
generally impose the same substantive and procedural
requirements on all regulated parties that fall within broadly
in which organized interests try to influence policy-making in the legislative and
executive branches of the U.S. Federal Government).
323. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (excluding from the statutory
definition of "hazardous substance" petroleum and certain petroleum products,
natural gas in gaseous or liquid form, and synthetic gas that can be used for
fuel); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(b)(2)-(5), (b)(7) (2012) (excluding from the statutory
definition of "hazardous waste" in regulations implementing the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act certain agricultural; mining; coal and other
fossil fuel combustion; crude oil, natural gas, and geothermal energy
exploration, development, or production; and ore and mineral extraction,
beneficiation, and processing wastes).
324. Cf. 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.43(a)(2), (e) (2011) (permitting a particular fossil-fuelfired steam generating facility in the State of Illinois to comply with an
alternative to the performance standard for sulfur dioxide applicable to other
fossil-fuel-fired steam generating facilities under the Clean Air Act).
325. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)
(2006) (requiring States to review periodically and to revise as appropriate–or at
the States' discretion to adopt as new–state ambient water quality standards in
accordance with the uses for which the States have designated the relevant
waters, and within certain federally imposed constraints); Clean Air Act §§
107(d)-(e), 161-63, 164(a)-(b), 166, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d)-(e), 7471-73, 7474(a)-(b),
7476 (2006) (authorizing States to designate or to redesignate certain air quality
control regions so as to permit new emissions of certain pollutants to different
degrees within different regions under the statutory provisions requiring the
prevention of significant deterioration of air quality within such regions, within
certainly federally imposed constraints); Council Directive 2000/60, Framework
for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, arts. 4(5), 5(1), 2000 O.J. (L
327) 1, 14-16 (EC) (as amended) (authorizing Member States to pursue
environmental objectives less stringent than otherwise would be required for
specific bodies of water when they are so heavily affected by human activity, as
determined by the Member States, or their natural condition is such that
achieving the objectives that otherwise would be required would be infeasible or
disproportionately expensive, under certain Community-imposed conditions).
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defined categories distinguished by the inherent attributes of
their members. The U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
for example, requires nearly all point source discharges of certain
pollutants to certain waters to comply with performance
standards based on the “best available technology economically
The
achievable” for the relevant point source category.326
regulations implementing the statute generally express these
performance standards in terms of numerical concentrations that
apply uniformly to discharges from all point sources in discrete
industrial sectors, such as steam electric power generators, with
some variation depending on the size of the facility.327 Similarly,
the
European
Community’s
Registration,
Evaluation,
Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation
generally requires any manufacturer or importer of a chemical
substance in quantities of one ton or more per year to register
that substance with the European Chemicals Agency.328 The
nearly universal equality with which substantive and procedural
requirements such as these are applied in the West is an
institutional expression of the principle of equality before the law,
which is an integral part of all Western legal traditions.329
Notwithstanding the PRC’s embrace of a host of Westernstyle policy design principles and implementation strategies as
mainstays of its environmental laws, 330 the principle of equality
before the law of which the nearly universal applicability of these
strategies in the West is an expression, and on which their
effectiveness depends, is foreign to the Chinese legal tradition.331
326. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 301(b)(2)(A)(i), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). Cf. id. §§ 502(12), (14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12), (14)
(defining "discharge of a pollutant" and "point source").
327. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.13(a)-(b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e), (g) (2012).
328. See
Council
Regulation
1907/2006,
Registration,
Evaluation,
Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), arts. 3(1)-(2), (9), (11),
(18), 6(1), 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1, 53-54, 55, 57, 62 (EC).
329. Cf. BELTON, supra note 243, at 9-10 (explaining the principle of equality
before the law as an essential element of the Western rule of law concept).
330. Cf. supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the
Western-style policy design principles and implementation strategies around
which the PRC's environmental laws revolve).
331. Cf., e.g., BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 21, 29 (attributing the
Confucian antipathy to law in part to its obliteration of Confucian social
relationships through the imposition of uniform behavioral norms, and
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In accordance with the Confucian essence of that tradition, which
rests in part on the Mencian conception of society as naturally
and harmoniously stratified,332 Chinese law always has been
applied unequally in ways that reflect prevailing social norms.333
The imperial fa, for example, treated different persons
differently–whether they were defendants, would-be defendants,
or convicted persons–depending on their status within the
Confucian social hierarchy, both in the abstract and relative to
any injured parties.334 Mao and his cadres substituted class
status for Confucian social rank as the relevant legal touchstone,
but retained the Confucian principle of inequality before the law
as a central feature of the PRC’s rudimentary socialist legal
system.335 Deng Xiaoping professed to make equality before the
law one of the central goals of the legal reforms that he
championed after Mao’s death.336
His emphasis was on
eliminating the extralegal political and economic privileges
enjoyed by certain CPC cadres by virtue of their party status,
however, which he blamed for causing great suffering among the
masses during the Cultural Revolution and for wounding the
CPC’s prestige, not on embracing the Western cultural conception
of equality before the law per se.337 More importantly, the belief
that the application of the positive law should be tempered by

emphasizing that the most basic distinction between the Legalist fa and the
Confucian li is the universalism of the former and the social and circumstantial
particularism of the latter).
332. Cf. supra note 81-82 and accompanying text (introducing Mencius and
summarizing his most important contributions to Confucianism).
333. These norms seem to have been as enduring as Confucianism itself,
despite the professed desires of would-be Westernizers to nibble around their
edges. Cf., e.g., SUN YAT-SEN, supra note 118, at 78-82 (arguing that there is no
such thing as natural human equality, but that an artificial equality in political
status could be and should be created).
334. Supra note 141 and accompanying text.
335. See Leng, supra note 193, at 363-65; Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, supra note
244, at 473, 473-74 n.14.
336. See, e.g., Carlos W. H. Lo, Deng Xiaoping's Ideas on Law: China on the
Threshold of a Legal Order, 32 ASIAN SURV. 649, 653-54, 656 (1992).
337. See Deng Xiaoping, On the Reform of the System of Party and State
Leadership (August 18, 1980), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (19751982) 302, 309, 315-16 (Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party
of China, 1984).
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extralegal factors such as the relationship and circumstances of
the parties and widely shared conceptions of justice remains
nearly as widespread in the PRC as it was in the Empire.338
This enduring Chinese cultural preference for flexible legal
norms that vary in accordance with the social relationships and
circumstances of the parties and reflect widely shared social
norms could be used to strengthen the PRC’s environmental law
and policy regime.339 The most basic conflict of relevance to the
relative ineffectiveness of environmental law in the PRC is the
conflict perceived to exist between short-term economic
development imperatives and longer term environmental quality
goals.340 Although the political pressures fueling this conflict
come from both the highest and lowest reaches of governance in
the PRC, its geographical locus is primarily local.341 One way of
using law to reconcile this conflict in a manner consistent with
the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition would be to
make the PRC’s environmental laws more pervasively but
precisely flexible in ways designed to accommodate–or even to
reinforce–economically relevant social relationships that are
valued throughout the local community. For example, the PRC’s
air and water pollution control statutes currently authorize
certain local governments to establish their own local
performance standards for sources of air and water pollution, but
only when those standards would be supplementary to or more
stringent than the national standards established by the Central
Government.342 These statutes probably would be viewed as

338. See Keller, supra note 20, at 715.
339. But cf. id. at 751 (arguing that the social context in which the laws are
applied is not likely to be as useful in stabilizing legal practice in China as it
once was because economic development and exposure to foreign influences have
undermined the homogeneity of Chinese society).
340. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
The sustainable
development concept is essentially an effort to demonstrate that this conflict is
more perceived than real. Cf. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON
FUTURE 43-46 (1987) (defining and elaborating on the sustainable development
concept).
341. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
342. See PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 13, paras. 1-2; PRC
Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 28, art. 7, paras. 1-2. Cf. PRC Marine
Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 10 (referring to "national and local water
pollutant discharge standards"). See generally PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note
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more legitimate locally–and thus probably would be more
effective nationwide–if they authorized local governments to relax
the national performance standards with respect to industrial
enterprises that play an especially important role in the local
economy, especially by providing large numbers of local people
with a decent living under decent working conditions, while
imposing more stringent standards on other enterprises, such as
those that employ mostly migrant workers from elsewhere in
China,343 albeit within the aggregate constraints implied by the
applicable ambient environmental quality standards.
This
arrangement would sacrifice the equality before the law that
Western legal traditions prize so highly, but which is foreign to
the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition, in order to
accommodate, if not to reinforce, certain widely valued local social
relationships that, if ignored, can undermine the local
effectiveness of environmental laws through both widespread
noncompliance and spotty enforcement.344
These preliminary suggestions for strategic corrections to the
current trajectory of the PRC’s environmental law and policy
regime hardly exhaust the possibilities. Yet each of them, if
implemented, would be an important step toward aligning that
regime more closely with the Confucian essence of the Chinese
legal tradition. Much like the negative yin and the positive yang,
China’s legal institutions and its legal culture must be
complementary if they are to function harmoniously as the two
halves of a coherent whole.345 The nominally Chinese but heavily

21, art. 10, (authorizing certain local governments to establish "local standards
for the discharge of pollutants" that supplement or are more stringent than the
national standards established by the Central Government).
343. See generally Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Factories Now Compete to Woo
Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/
13/world/asia/13factory.html (exploring the complexities of the migrant factory
labor market in the PRC).
344. Cf. supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (explaining how local
economic development imperatives impair the effectiveness of the PRC's
environmental laws).
345. According to one of the ancient Chinese cosmologies on which imperial
Confucianism is based, the negative yin and the positive yang are the two
complementary forces that control the universe. See, e.g., SMITH & WENG, supra
note 85, at 79-80. For a summary of the origin and content of imperial
Confucianism, see supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
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law-based, essentially Western approach to mitigating the
negative environmental impacts of industrialization that the PRC
has pursued in recent decades, on the one hand, and the ancient
Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition, on the other,
hardly could be less complementary. By transforming the former
so as to align it with the latter, the PRC could harmonize its
efforts to solve its environmental crisis, which would make those
efforts much more effective. Given the depth and breadth of that
crisis, as well as the PRC’s growing contribution to the
exacerbation of global environmental challenges such as
anthropogenic climate change, neither China nor the world has
any time to lose.
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